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Abstract
This thesis describes research into security mechanisms for protecting sensitive
areas of memory from tampering or intrusion using the facilities of Systems Man-
agement Mode.
The essence and challenge of modern computer security is to isolate or contain
data and applications in a variety of ways, while still allowing sharing where desir-
able. If Alice and Bob share a computer, Alice should not be able to access Bob’s
passwords or other data; Alice’s web browser should not be able to be tricked into
sending email, and viewing a social networking web page in that browser should
not allow that page to interact with her online banking service.
The aim of this work is to explore techniques for such isolation and how they
can be used usefully on standard PCs.
This work focuses on the creation of a small dedicated area to perform cryp-
tographic operations, isolated from the rest of the system. This is a sufficiently
useful facility that many modern devices such as smartphones incorporate dedic-
ated hardware for this purpose, but other approaches have advantages which are
discussed.
As a case study, this research included the creation of a secure web server whose
encryption key is protected using this approach such that even an intruder with
full Administrator level access cannot extract the key. A proof of concept backdoor
which captures and exfiltrates encryption keys using a modified processor was also
demonstrated.
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—Every contact leaves a
trace
Dr Edmond Locard
1
Introduction
It is a founding principle of forensic science that ‘Every contact leaves a trace’ (Dr
Edmond Locard, elaborated by Kirk 1953). More recently, it has become apparent
that every point of contact between entities in computer systems leaves analogous
traces, often with important security implications.
This makes it important to achieve effective isolation between components,
in particular between sensitive ones and those most vulnerable to compromise
or subject to external influence; this concept was implemented in OpenSSH by
1
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Provos, Friedl and Honeyman 2003 and is discussed further and a semi-automated
mechanism for implementing such isolation introduced in Brumley and Song 2004,
including an experiment modifying the stunnel SSL/TLS server to handle the
keys in a separate process similar to experiment 2b described later in this thesis.
Merely reading a value in memory has long been considered side-effect free for
security and developer purposes (Gifford and Lucassen 1986). Processor caching,
however, contradicts this: by precisely measuring the time taken to retrieve data
from the same location later, other code can determine whether or not that retrieval
operation was performed against a given location — leading to the Spectre attacks
(Kocher et al. 2018).
To achieve better security, then, we must manage — and limit — the inter-
action between components much better than we have so far. Covert channels
and side channels depend on unexpected interactions; RowHammer (Kim et al.
2014), for example, can be used to achieve privilege escalation (Seaborn and Dul-
lien 2015) via a previously-unexpected interaction between physically proximate
memory components. Since there was no correlation between physical and virtual
addresses (different processes and the kernel would commingle pages arbitrarily),
low-privilege pages could easily be found which happened to be adjacent to highly
sensitive system ones, allowing tampering. The same applies between virtual ma-
chines and hypervisor control structures. As detailed later, the more coarse-grained
the sharing gets, the more limited the avenues of attack become, though any level
of shared caching can be an avenue of attack (Liu et al. 2015).
The principle was expanded upon by Paul Kirk (Kirk 1953) in another context
decades ago, but is also applicable to computer security in this context: to achieve
security, we must carefully limit and control every interaction across security peri-
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meters:
Wherever he steps, whatever he touches, whatever he leaves, even un-
consciously, will serve as a silent witness against him. Not only his
fingerprints or his footprints, but his hair, the fibers from his clothes,
the glass he breaks, the tool mark he leaves, the paint he scratches,
the blood or semen he deposits or collects. All of these and more, bear
mute witness against him. This is evidence that does not forget. It
is not confused by the excitement of the moment. It is not absent
because human witnesses are. It is factual evidence. Physical evidence
cannot be wrong, it cannot perjure itself, it cannot be wholly absent.
Only human failure to find it, study and understand it, can diminish
its value. — Paul Kirk (Kirk 1953)
1.1 Background
This work began with an investigation of direct memory access attacks, partly in-
spired by proof of concept attacks over Thunderbolt (Hudson and Rudolph 2015)
and FireWire/IEEE1394 (Dornseif 2004). Proposed protection for the system’s
primary processor against such attacks dates at least as far back as MIT’s proposed
2002 memory authentication scheme (Suh et al. 2003). Previous work had focussed
on implementing a more limited coprocessor dedicated to security-essential func-
tions (Yee 1994) (Smith and Weingart 1999); other work proposed architectural
modifications intended to achieve more secure execution (Lie et al. 2000).
At an early stage, during 2014, some other aspects of hardware isolation and
data protection were also investigated, including simulating a processor-level back-
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door for capturing and subsequently exfiltrating encryption keys being used in
conjunction with Intel’s AES acceleration instruction set, AES-NI, as introduced
in 2010. Four years after this work was published, it was revealed in CVE-2018-
3665: Intel Core-based Processors ‘Lazy FPU Restore’ Lets Local Users Obtain
Potentially Sensitive FPU State Information on the Target System 2018 under the
name ‘LazyFP’ that Intel had in fact unintentionally implemented a very sim-
ilar mechanism in production silicon for years, disclosing encryption keys across
process and virtual machine boundaries.
In investigating DMA attacks and protection, it became clear that either DMA
would have to be disabled entirely (Microsoft’s proposed mitigation at the time,
Microsoft Corporation 2017), carefully managed via IOMMU I/O virtualisation
(on platforms which support this), or through use of a distinct area of memory
which is already excluded from DMA access for other reasons — an enclave. Whilst
the former option has significant drawbacks (loss of performance or even function-
ality on external storage) and the IOMMU was only introduced to x86 as ‘VT-d’ in
Intel’s ‘Nehalem’ microarchitecture, with availability being limited and full usage
requiring significant driver modifications. The Qubes operating system and Xen
research project on which it built both explored these issues in depth in various
ways, creating mechanisms for failure containment on drivers and their associated
devices.
Computer security is largely concerned with erecting boundaries between en-
tities: users, privilege levels, processes. Wherever a resource crosses a boundary, it
creates the potential for compromise, either through passive information leakage
(as in the case of timing attacks, where the exact details of how long an operation
takes inadvertently discloses some information) or the potential for active tamper-
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ing (as in RowHammer, where writing to one memory location indirectly affects
another through non-obvious electrical coupling between parts of a memory chip).
Historically, the term ‘enclave’ was used to refer to ‘a part of a country that
is surrounded by another country, or a group of people who are different from the
people living in the surrounding area’ (Cambridge University Press 2018). In a
computer security context, the term is applied to ‘(a) an isolated process, executed
on a platform that provides confidentiality and integrity of code and data as well
as (b) sealing and (c) attestation.’ (Beekman 2016). In this case, the focus is
on (a) and (b) as detailed later under Threat Model, since attestation addresses
specific scenarios not applicable in this case.
This work explores various threats and mitigation techniques, then evaluates
some possibilities on existing x86 architecture in terms of protecting against various
avenues of attack. While the ‘enclave’ concept is a particular approach to guarding
against one threat model with substantial overheads and associated issues, an
alternative approach is explored here, aiming to deliver a ‘defence in depth’ using
the existing x86 architecture in novel ways.
Commercial enclave offerings such as Intel’s SGX aim to offer a minimal Trus-
ted Computing Base (TCB), in which the security of the system is reliant largely
on Intel alone, rather than on the hosting company or the manufacturers of other
system components. (For example, any compromise of the RAM could not result
in information disclosure, since the contents remain encrypted with a key available
only to the CPU or Intel.)
More generally, SGX is one cryptographic technique for reducing the TCB by
one component, in this case removing reliance on system RAM and peripherals:
code and data are encrypted, guarding against eavesdropping, and checksummed
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to guard against tampering. This approach has a long history in computing:
network connections are commonly encrypted using TLS for the same reason, Full
Disk Encryption and Self Encrypting Drives are increasingly popular for storage.
This protection was defeated in 2018 via side-channel attack (Chen et al.
2018a), forcing Intel to update SGX’s deployment mechanism to be able to check
the Spectre attacks were properly mitigated on the target hardware.
1.2 Context
Within the broader field of computer security, this work combines some existing
concepts in a novel way.
1.2.1 Privacy and Integrity of Communications
The privacy and integrity of communications has been a high priority in computer
science and security research for a long time now, with added financial importance
now with the dramatic increase in e-commerce and individual companies in the
field now having market capitalisations in the hundreds of billions of pounds.
Security breaches can even have impact beyond the financial, as illustrated
by the suicides following the exposure of users of the Ashley Madison adultery
facilitation site (Mansfield-Devine 2015).
The scale and importance may be newer, but the underlying need for privacy
and protecting information, as well as the use of forms of encryption, dates back
at least two thousand years (Churchhouse and Churchhouse 2002).
Within this vast area of study, protection can be divided into three primary
areas:
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• Avoiding storing information at all — for example, passwords can be kept
in a hashed form, enabling correct passwords to be identified without ever
storing the password itself.
• Protecting information at rest — Full Disk Encryption and password-
protected archive files protect information by requiring a password or other
key material before that information can be accessed.
• Protecting information in transit — Protecting messages in transit via cryp-
tography or steganography (both derived from terms for ‘hidden writing’,
using the Greek words κρυπτός and στεγανός respectively).
This work focuses on improving robustness of the last of these areas, through
a new approach to the second: protecting encryption keys while held within a
computer system for use in securing communications over a network, constructing
and analysing a proof of concept web server which handles encryption keys using
secure memory protection techniques.
1.2.2 Minimum Privilege
Securing a system by denying each principal (a user, hardware or software com-
ponent) access to anything they do not require access to. These restrictions are
an important building block in subsection 1.2.3.
1.2.3 Defence in Depth — Fault Containment
In broader engineering terms, it is considered good practice to incorporate fault
containment: if and when one component fails for some reason, it should do so in
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such a way as to minimise the damage done to the rest of the system. Electrical
systems often incorporate fuses and residual current devices, so that when an
electrical fault develops it will interrupt the power supply rather than endanger
the user or start a fire.
In a computing context, we should consider this for both security and system
stability reasons: a malfunctioning word processor should endeavour to shut down
without corrupting the files being edited; however badly that word processor might
malfunction, the operating system should ensure it cannot damage the file system
or interfere with other applications or users on that system. Early implementations
were poor at this: a malfunctioning application could hang or crash the whole
system, sometimes causing the file system to be corrupted in the process, an issue
addressed by process and user isolation and journalled file systems.
1.2.4 Minimal Trusted Computing Base
A similar concept to subsection 1.2.2, systems should be designed so that a minimal
subset of components have to function properly for security to be maintained. A
faulty or malicious mouse, for example, should not be able to leak your password
or banking information, even if compromised by a skilled adversary.
1.3 Aim & Hypothesis
The aim is to explore the available facilities for data protection within modern pro-
cessor architectures, including recent special-purpose additions, and more formally:
Demonstrate that secure isolation can be practically implemented us-
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ing only the long-established Systems Management Mode mechanisms,
giving better security isolation than existing techniques such as process
separation.
More specifically, a series of experiments will develop and explore protection
of private encryption keys in a server environment, using an HTTPS web server
implementation as a test case.
In the chapter 2, the technical background to this work is established, along
with the historical context and the details of relevant attack and protection tech-
niques. An analysis of how security can best be achieved in this context is dis-
cussed in chapter 3, with the technical details of Systems Management Mode for
this purpose in chapter 4.
The experimental technique is discussed in chapter 5. Results of these experi-
ments are then detailed in chapter 6, with an analysis of the implications of these
results in chapter 7.
The work is then summarised in chapter 8 followed by a discussion of some
possible future work building on this research.
2
Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
Memory protection is an essential element of modern operating system and security
design. This chapter provides a historical context to the evolution of this concept
and modern implementations thereof, as well as highlighting the most important
issues discussed later.
From the earliest days of time-sharing systems, research has developed a vari-
10
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ety of schemes for protecting system memory, primarily from internal software
threats (partitioning memory to allow multiple independent uses while minim-
ising conflict), as well as a less common goal of guarding against forms of physical
external access, be it malfunctioning or misconfigured hardware or malicious in-
terference.
The conventional model of memory learned by programmers and provided by
operating system designers is that RAM is simply a homogenous sequence of bytes
or words, uniformly accessible, changing only when that location is explicitly writ-
ten to; the more sophisticated model after studying some operating system theory
includes the fact each page of memory can be made off-limits, read-only (with or
without the ability to execute the contents as code) or writable. Every aspect
of this model has been subverted in various ways, leading to significant attack
avenues detailed here.
2.2 Historical Context
The very earliest computers such as Colossus executed only pre-determined pro-
grammes (Copeland 2010), often co-developed with the hardware on which they
ran. In the simple implicit trust model of the time, security was not a concern:
code and computer were a monolithic entity, with no concerns about conflicting
code since there was no other code present, and peripherals had no autonomy
which could cause problems.
This had the unintentional advantage of tamper-resistance, an aspect retained
for that reason in some security and safety critical designs today in simple embed-
ded systems.
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As the world progressed to the Von Neumann architecture, blending code and
data, a hierarchy of trust evolved. Time-sharing and multi-user systems created a
need for restrictions: one user’s code had to be prevented from consuming resources
needed by another, or accessing their data without permission, and more intelligent
peripherals created the possiblity of conflicting accesses.
The IBM 709 mainframe introduced Channel I/O in 1957, a precursor of Direct
Memory Access I/O described later. The preceding 704 model left I/O to the main
processor, via simple read and write instructions1 — on the 709, tape, printer and
card devices could be attached and operate independently of the processor. To
manage this, an IBM 766 Data Synchronizer gave programmers control of this
process, as well as some degree of error handling, although programming was still
a monolithic single-tasking system with no concept of privilege levels or access
controls: the programme had full control of the data and attached peripherals
while executing.
It was on these architectures, however, that John McCarthy and his colleagues
first demonstrated time-sharing execution at MIT (Corbató, Merwin-Daggett and
Daley 1962). Their eventual ‘Compatible Time Sharing System’ and the underly-
ing research were prescient in many ways, with consideration of resource starvation,
a form of virtual memory in task swapping and even anticipation of the risks of
‘thrashing’, but security was not yet a major consideration, perhaps because the
concurrent users were all physically co-located at the multiple consoles, although
password authentication was incorporated.
1More specifically, CPY, Copy and Skip, which would read or write from a specified location
chosen by a prior RDS – Read Select – or WRS – Write Select – operation; the only error
handling consisted of halting execution and lighting the ‘read-write check light’ on the operator
console if the operation timed out. IBM 1955
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The two IBM 7094 machines used for this system were modified in one import-
ant way to facilitate this service: two separate banks of memory were installed
rather than the usual one. The privileged ‘A-core’ contained and could only be
accessed by the ‘kernel’ code, invoked via interrupts from user code or hardware.
(This replaced the previous work using earlier 704 and 709 machines.)
Mainframes made early use of techniques similar to DMA to offload routine
data transfer from expensive processors, dating as far back as the vacuum tube-
based IBM 709 mainframe of 1958. Unlike the previous model, the 704, this
offloaded I/O tasks to the Model 766 Data Synchronizer (Bell and Newell 1971),
which could transfer data to or from peripherals while the central processor con-
tinued uninterrupted.
Early PCs featured a component called a DMA controller, an Intel 8237, a
simple device which could be instructed to read some number of bytes either
from memory or from a device, writing each byte to memory or another device.
Although devices accessed in this way gain many of the advantages of DMA, they
do not have any control over memory access: only the 8237 itself performs actual
DMA operations. On a device level, the connection is more akin to the mainframe
‘channel’ approach, passively receiving read and write commands.
When later facilities such as the PCI bus enabled true DMA, where devices
could read or write memory independently, DMA was prefixed with the otherwise-
redundant qualifier “bus mastering”, or ‘BM-DMA’.
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2.3 Physical RAM
Even before the transistor, computers had Random Access Memory of some form:
fundamentally, a set of words which could be retrieved and modified by address.
Some of the very earliest computers used mechanical magnetic drum memory for
main memory, in a similar system to modern hard or floppy disk drives, or ultra-
sonic delay lines - in both cases, accessing a particular unit of memory required
waiting for that unit to reach the head again.
Magnetic core memory was invented in 1947 and quickly replaced these ap-
proaches, itself being replaced by a solid state counterpart in the 70s. The most
common since then has been DRAM, Dynamic RAM, in which a single capacitor
is either charged (to represent a 1) or discharged (for 0). This is simple, robust
and effective, but since a capacitor’s charge dissipates over time, a periodic refresh
cycle is required, recharging each 1 before it falls to a low enough voltage to be
mistaken for a 0.
2.4 Hardware Attacks
In the majority of cases, anyone with physical access to the hardware is assumed
to be trusted: they have the ability to replace the hardware in its entirety, or
components thereof. Exceptions to this threat model, where for various reasons
a physical custodian must also be protected against, present an interesting set of
situations and solutions.
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2.4.1 Cold Boot Attack
In a cold boot attack (Halderman et al. 2009), the entire operating system (and
hypervisor, if present) is replaced by power-cycling and booting from alternative
media provided by the attacker. This technique has long been used to capture
forensic images of target systems for ‘static analysis’ offline, targetting the per-
sistent storage media rather than RAM contents, but the technique also allows
capture of RAM contents including encryption keys and other system state, useful
to an attacker or forensic analyst.
2.4.2 Rowhammer Attacks
This enables the lowest level attack on memory, RowHammer (Kim et al. 2014) —
by repeatedly writing to one location in memory to which the attacker does have
access, physically adjacent bits can be changed through electrical coupling.
Seaborn and Dullien 2015 demonstrated this from within a web browser sand-
box, using the resulting memory corruption to achieve privilege escalation.
CVE-2018-1038: Microsoft Windows — Local Privilege Escalation 2018
demonstrated that modifying even a single bit can completely bypass operating
system memory protection. In the latter, the user/system bit on the top level
page table entry was wrongly set to ‘user’, enabling unprivileged code to modify
all other page table data and so gain full control of all code and memory.
Two versions of mitigation for this attack were incorporated in Intel’s Ivy
Bridge architecture. Where supported by the memory, the pseudo target row re-
fresh (pTRR) feature causes specific target rows to be refreshed ahead of schedule
to prevent excess leakage corrupting values; in the absence of this targeted mech-
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anism, Ivy Bridge chips default to refreshing the DRAM at double the normal rate
to achieve similar protection at a cost of 2-4% higher memory access latency due
to increased frequency of refresh-access conflicts.
2.4.3 Bus Level Attacks
Given full physical control of a target system, memory contents can be retrieved
and manipulated in various ways which are not otherwise possible. DMA attacks
are a variant of this discussed later, exploiting authorised access for unauthorised
purposes, and have spawned a whole field of legitimate applications in forensic
analysis, including Live Memory Forensics; Windows versions prior to Windows
10 version 1607, for example, could be debugged and probed directly over a 1394
(Firewire) bus cable (Microsoft Corporation 2018), which facilitates DMA. The
Intel Direct Connect Interface (DCI) brought this capability to USB 3 ports (Lau-
terbach GmbH 2018).
Embedded systems such as games consoles are commonly designed to be less
amenable to user debugging and reverse engineering, however, and avoid present-
ing such powerful avenues of attack. George Hotz gained full memory access on
the Sony PlayStation 3 (a privilege escalation or hypervisor escape) by corrupt-
ing the hypervisor’s memory map through a combined hardware and software
attack (Lawson 2010): a piece of low-level software to set up appropriate data
structures in memory, then a simple fault-injection device implemented on a field
programmable gate array (FPGA, programmable hardware) to interfere with the
hypervisor’s memory access at a crucial point. When executed successfully, this
leaves the user code with the ability to read and write otherwise-protected memory
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areas and bypass the hypervisor’s access controls.
Bus level access was also exploited against Microsoft’s XBox by Huang 2002.
This class of attack is more generally referred to as a ‘fault attack’ or ‘glitching
attack’ (Bar-El et al. 2006), shown to be a powerful and low-cost avenue of attack
even for an attacker with limited resources available (Anderson and Kuhn 1997).
2.4.4 Test Port Attack
The JTAG (Joint Test Action Group) port is a standardised mechanism for testing
and debugging electronic circuits defined by IEEE 1149.1 and IEEE 1149.7. For
devices where the manufacturer wishes to impede the owner altering or reverse-
engineering the product, this is usually disabled – for example, Microsoft’s Xbox
360 games console disables the JTAG ports in software very early in the boot
process (DeBusschere and McCambridge 2012).
In a typical desktop/laptop computer scenario, this is not considered a major
vulnerability since the JTAG port is not accessible without dissassembly of the
computer. Intel, however, exposed comparable system debug functionality via an
externally connected USB port (CVE-2017-5689: Intel Active Management Tech-
nology Authentication Flaw Lets Remote and Local Users Gain Elevated Privileges
2017) as part of their Active Management Technology. (The port was apparently
intended to be internal to the system chassis, which would have reduced the se-
curity implications in typical scenarios.)
Given the intentionally unconstrained access such ports give, the only effective
mechanism to guard against this is to disable the ports in question, as the Xbox
does, or physically protect against access, for example by locating a server in a
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suitably secure facility.
Taking full control of the memory bus on modern systems is a difficult under-
taking: 64 or more data lines carrying signals at speeds of 1 GHz or more, with
extremely precise timing requirements. Huang 2002 explored the costs and prac-
ticalities, finding the main memory bus to be prohibitive in that context, though
access to the narrower and slower HyperTransport peripheral bus was achievable
and sufficient. Similar attacks against other parts such as the I2C bus were detailed
by Giller 2015.
2.4.5 DMA Attack
The development of FireWire and Thunderbolt interfaces exposed DMA facilit-
ies outside the relative physical security of the system chassis enabling an early
successful attack on Mac OS X systems over FireWire (Dornseif 2004) and later
more complex attacks such as ThunderStrike (Hudson and Rudolph 2015). When
successful, these attacks give similar functionality to those in subsection 2.4.3 but
using existing components rather than physical changes or additions to the target.
2.5 Context Switches and KAISER/KPTI
Most modern processor architectures implement some form of virtual memory map-
ping (Denning 1970): the memory a user process can access at address 0x10000
may be stored in any arbitrary page of physical memory, or indeed be entirely
absent and filled in by the operating system when an attempt is next made to
access that, known as a ‘page fault’.
To reduce the overhead of loading this mapping from memory, processors gen-
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 19
erally feature Translation Lookaside Buffers (TLBs), a set of cached address map-
pings. (Architectures have varying approaches to this; on MIPS, the operating
system explicitly populates TLB entries as needed; x86 and more recent ARM
variants populate TLB entries directly within the hardware without OS involve-
ment, while the original ARMv2 had 512 explicit memory mappings within the
MEMC1 memory controller chip as Content Addressable Memory.)
On x86, paging is controlled by Control Register 3 (CR3, also referred to as
the Page Directory Base Register), which holds the physical address of the top
level of the page table. Any write operation to CR3 automatically flushes all TLB
entries which have not been marked ‘global’.
A ‘CR3 reload’ is therefore an expensive operation in CPU resources, triggering
a series of memory accesses, and required on each transition between different
processes.
The Meltdown attack (Lipp et al. 2018) exploits small performance differences
as a way of accessing otherwise inaccessible memory contents on vulnerable pro-
cessors, including Intel’s Core and Xeon families and some ARM designs. By using
a target byte as the offset into an accessible table in main memory, the correspond-
ing row becomes cached. The fetch operation itself is aborted, having accessed a
prohibited address, but the next direct access to that row will succeed, and do
so faster than access to the other rows since only that one has been preloaded to
cache.
Prior to this discovery, it was thought to be safe for the kernel’s memory space
to be mapped globally at all times, relying on marking those pages as kernel-only.
To prevent the Meltdown attack being used, the kernel pages had to be unmapped
and remapped when exiting and reentering kernel mode, a mitigation implemented
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on the Linux kernel under the names KAISER or KPTI: the protected pages are
not merely off-limits (so their address cannot be used directly), but they have no
address at all, usable or otherwise.
The x86 architecture’s Systems Management Mode, described in detail in
chapter 4, already provided a similar level of isolation and consequently already
protected against attacks of this type, as well as having protection from DMA
attack which KAISER/KPTI does not. The SMM handler code cannot be in-
voked except by triggering a hardware SystemManagement Interrupt (SMI), which
causes the processor to switch memory maps; ARM’s TrustZone transfers control
to the ‘Secure World’ environment via an analogous mechanism, their Secure Mon-
itor Call (SMC) exception.
2.6 Summary
Comprehensive memory protection addresses a broad spectrum of modern security
threats, including pre-emptively guarding against some classes of unknown issues.
This thesis proposes an approach to deliver this protection using SMM (Systems
Management Mode) in chapter 4, followed by a discussion of previous related work.
Attacks can broadly be divided into physical (those requiring access to the
device itself, for example by connecting or disconnecting components) and logical
or remote (by reprogramming or tricking existing components in software alone).
As detailed later, SMM can be used to guard against both classes: even Adminis-
trator or root level access is not sufficient to compromise SMM isolation, and only
the processor and memory chips themselves (and the electrical bus connections
between them) have the ability to access the protected SMRAM area.
—The art of war teaches us
to rely not on the likelihood
of the enemy’s not coming,
but on our own readiness
to receive him; not on the
chance of his not attacking,
but rather on the fact that we
have made our position unas-
sailable.
Tzu 6th century BC
3
Security Requirements
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter detailed the importance of memory isolation and classes
of attacks involved. This chapter develops these themes and analyses their im-
plications in terms of the possible avenues of attack on an SMM-based security
implementation in various circumstances, as well as possible mitigations.
The primary hypothesis to be explored here is that hardware memory isol-
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ation, as implemented in a case study using Intel’s x86 SMM, can be used to
deliver similar protection of cryptographic keys to that in the PlayStation 3’s Cell
architecture or a dedicated hardware security module (HSM), without hardware
requirements beyond a standard x86 computer system. Experimentation will aim
to demonstrate and evaluate such an implementation, with a particular focus on
use to secure a web server’s TLS implementation and the public key material on
which it depends, through careful consideration and management of the points of
interaction between the sensitive components (the cryptographic code and data in
use) and the rest of the system.
The security aim is an instance of defence in depth: not intending to prevent
any specific attack, but to reduce the impact of successful attacks in general. The
later evaluation will consider this in the context of various known attacks and
mitigations, particularly those where separation of components either has been or
could have been used to prevent or reduce the impact of a compromise.
3.2 Scenario
This work aims to secure a network-connected system against remote or transient
physical attack, using a simple web server as the model and endeavouring to protect
it against unauthorised information disclosure, in particular the cryptographic keys
which are used to authenticate the server to clients. (This is clearly generalisable to
securing the authentication material on the client end as well: client cryptographic
keys, stored passwords, payment mechanisms.)
Other scenarios exist: games consoles attempt to guard against the system
owner accessing or modifying data (for example, to reverse engineer the system,
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circumvent copy protection or to cheat), which requires a different approach. At-
tacks such as those mentioned previously in subsection 2.4.3 remain pertinent there
however; in particular, the technical and economic aspects discussed in Huang
2002.
To protect the most sensitive data requires the construction of some sort of
containment to which access from all other components is restricted or prevented
— but with just enough interaction permitted to enable the intended use of the
keys (or other material) in question.
For an SSL/TLS web server, the sensitive data is created as a public/private
key pair. As the name implies, the public part of the pair may be freely exported
and shared — indeed, it is provided to every client connecting, as part of the initial
protocol handshake — while the private key is never to be disclosed to anyone else.
To prove the identify of the server, a CSR (Certificate Signing Request) is
generated and signed using the private key; after completion of appropriate checks,
a Certification Authority (either one trusted by the general public and the software
they use, such as LetsEncrypt, or an internal entity such as the US Department of
Defense’s internal CA) usually signs that CSR to produce a certificate. Any entity
can issue certificates, it is merely a matter of policy which issuers are trusted or
not for any given situation; for experimental purposes, a self-issued certificate is
equally suitable.
LetsEncrypt uses the ACME protocol to sign CSRs without human interven-
tion, using challenge-response proofs of identity as part of a broader effort to
make shorter certificate lifetimes practical, while public Certificate Transparency
logs provide an additional safeguard against inappropriate certificate issuance.
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3.3 Threat Model
Two vital considerations in any threat model are the expected levels of technical
resources and physical access available to the attacker. A related parameter is the
duration of access, from having transient physical custody of a device (for example,
a government agency intercepting a server in transit from the manufacturer) to
persistent infiltration of a facility (either through personnel, such as a bribed or
undercover employee, or technical, as in a compromised device or covert addition
to the network).
At one extreme of the former spectrum lie ‘nation state’ adversaries: govern-
ment agencies, expected to have substantial budgets and skill sets with few or no
legal constraints in place, often with prior knowledge of attacks not yet known to
the academic security community and not motivated by direct financial gain —
for example Stuxnet (Langner 2011), where the aim was not to obtain information
or perform useful work, but merely to damage a specific SCADA system. The op-
posite end of this spectrum is occupied by a more typical ‘hacker’ or botnet, using
relatively simple attack techniques to harvest banking credentials, send spam or
perform volumetric (‘brute force’) DDoS attacks (Cooke, Jahanian and McPherson
2005).
Physical access runs a spectrum of levels, from no proximity at all, through the
ability to attach some external device such as some external storage, to replacing or
modifying internal hardware. Orthogonally, this access may be transient or more
persistent. The American NSA and their British counterpart GCHQ have long-
running programmes to compromise products from the design stage (Ball, Borger
and Greenwald 2013), to intercepting equipment in transit from manufacturers to
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customers (Kirk 2013) onwards (Kingsbury 2009). Some of the possible attack
scenarios are listed below:
• Replace CPU or memory
• Interfere with memory bus, as in the PS3 ‘glitching’ hypervisor escape
• Install keylogger
• Replace or modify BIOS content
• RCE
• Credential Theft
• Social Engineering
• ‘Evil Maid’ (Tereshkin 2010)
This work aims to guard the encryption keys against all but the upper extreme
of attacker resources: remote attacks including root and kernel level compromise,
as well as physical attacks short of replacement or modification of the system itself.
A root compromise would allow monitoring of network traffic while the com-
promise persists, but gaining access to the key would enable impersonation of
the server even after the attacker loses access again, which is why the Heartbleed
key exposure vulnerability was considered so serious: the additional protection
afforded here reduces the damage by such a compromise.
Given an attacker with the resources to replace or modify the processor itself,
however (perhaps through a suitably designed microcode patch, rather than phys-
ical circuit changes), security is almost impossible to achieve; the first experiment
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described in chapter 5 demonstrates the possibilities for an attacker with such
capabilities.
3.4 RowHammer
The RowHammer attack allows modification of bits in physically adjacent areas of
memory, which could theoretically be used to exfiltrate information from the SMM
enclave. Integrity checking (a checksum verified on each entry) would provide some
protection against this, while ASLR would make such an attack almost impossible
— just shifting the code and data by a small random number of bytes each time
the system is booted would mean the attacker was operating blindly (able to flip
some bits, but without knowledge of which instruction or piece of data is being
affected), while the use of ‘canary’ values around the code and data would make
such an attempted attack very unlikely to go undetected.
Moreover, given sufficient knowledge of the memory arrangement in use, simply
adding a single disused row between the SMM code and data area and memory
used by the system would frustrate any RowHammer attempt: it would corrupt
only that buffer space, with no effect on the SMM area.
Also, on the specific test hardware used for the majority of this experimenta-
tion, the DDR2 memory installed is much less susceptible to RowHammer attacks
anyway: exploiting this generally requires DDR3 or newer, due to the smaller
feature size and faster access.
A similar approach would also be effective against most direct hardware at-
tacks, such as address line glitching: without knowing the exact address to target, a
successful attack would be very much more difficult than against a system without
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this protection.
3.5 Spectre/Meltdown
The most recent memory protection attacks against vulnerable Intel and ARM
processor architectures pose two potential threats against an SMM protection im-
plementation.
Firstly, the Meltdown techniques can be used directly to extract otherwise
protected data, for example from kernel buffers, by using the address of that data
indirectly then observing side-effects of that operation. This is not applicable to
SMM code or data, since there is no address which refers to that memory in the
first place. This was empirically verified by Eclypsium (2018).
Secondly, the Spectre attacks have been used against system firmware executing
in SMM to bypass bounds checks (ibid.) — that issue is avoided entirely in this
work by using only fixed size parameters, with no bounds checks or boundaries to
be violated.
3.6 Summary
The set of relevant attacks discussed in chapter 2 was assessed in the context of
this threat model, along with some general principles for mitigating or preventing
them. In chapter 4 a specific approach to addressing these using SMM will be
described, followed by experimentation in chapter 5 for testing the viability of this
approach in an example system.
4
Systems Management Mode for Security
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents an overview of the origins of the Systems Management Mode
on Intel processors, with information about its attributes and implementation in
particular as relevant to a security context, as well as noting related concepts and
developments on other platforms and virtualisation approaches.
The chapter concludes with some discussion of other related approaches and
28
CHAPTER 4. SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT MODE FOR SECURITY 29
another application of SMM for security purposes.
The experimentation presented in chapter 5 will build on this analysis to ex-
plore the main hypothesis, that SMM can be used to deliver improved security
isolation.
4.2 Origins
The Systems Management Mode was first introduced on Intel’s 80386SL pro-
cessor, the first low-power variant of the 386 architecture intended for portable
use. This mode was introduced as a way for the system BIOS to operate certain
low-level components (such as the battery, charging subsystem and screen back-
light) without conflicting with the main operating system (in those days, typically
MS-DOS, which had no inherent support for mobile devices and limited ability to
be extended to support them explicitly).
Prior to this, Intel had implemented In-Circuit Emulation — ICE — mode as
a debugging facility on the 80286 (Collins 1997b), allowing the full processor state
to be saved and later restored (via the undocumented special-purpose LOADALL
instruction, opcode 0x0f05 or the later 80386 variant, 0x0f07). On the Pentium,
this was then replaced with a more sophisticated Probe Mode (Collins 1997a).
Key attributes of SMM and ICE are compared in Table 4.1.
Superficially SMM and the ICE modes have a lot in common: saving the
existing processor state to a special-purpose area of memory, switching execution
to a dedicated handler routine, then resuming execution later, transparently to
the operating system and applications — similar to normal interrupt handling,
but with the addition of transitioning to an alternative memory map with areas
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Parameter SMM ICE
Entry trigger pin SMI ICEBP
Trigger opcode N/A1 ICEBP (Collins 1996) (0xf1)
Exit opcode RSM LOADALL
Table 4.1: Comparison of SMM and ICE attributes
of memory not accessible otherwise.
4.3 SMRAM and privilege levels
The defining characteristic of SMM is that while the processor core is executing
code in that mode, it asserts the SMIACT2 output line. This signal is interpreted
by the Memory Controller Hub (MCH): when asserted, addresses are decoded dif-
ferently, enabling access to the otherwise-inaccessible SMRAM area. (Physically,
this is just part of the main RAM, but gated by the memory controller to prevent
non-SMM access.) In early SMM implementations, the address used was 0xA0000,
which is also used by legacy graphics support: any attempt by non-SMM code to
read or write this area will access the video memory instead.
The location of SMRAM is defined by the SMBASE register, initially set
to 0x30000 (192 kilobytes from the bottom of the memory space); setting the
G_SMRAME control flag on the processor’s SMRAMC (SMRAM control) register puts
128 kilobytes of SMRAM at a base address of 0xA0000, or 640 kilobytes, while
setting T_EN (TSEG Enable) grants access to a larger area higher up. The address
layout is depicted in Table 4.2.
It is important to note that SMM is not a privileged mode of execution as such,
despite common references to it as ‘ring -1’ or ‘ring -2’ as if it were a more privileged
2The overscore denotes an electronic signal which is pulled low when active, rather than high
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Address Size Content (normal) Content (SMM)
0xF0000 64k BIOS ROM
0xC0000 192k Device ROM/Upper Memory Blocks
0xA0000 128k Legacy video SMRAM
0x00000 640k Legacy (DOS) memory
Table 4.2: The x86 processor memory map
alternative to ring 0 in which kernel code executes. For example, Wojtczuk and
Rutkowska 2009 refers to “escalation from Ring 3 to SMM” — in reality, SMM
code is entered in ring 0, and can transition to a reduced privilege level if desired.
In all cases, access to the SMRAM area is permitted only if the access is by
the processor core (as opposed to any other peripheral), and then only if either
SMIACT is asserted or the D_OPEN control bit in the system chipset is set to permit
this. As a result, SMRAM has robust protection against any sort of DMA attack:
attempted access from the PCI bus or elsewhere is not valid at any time.
4.4 Bootstrapping SMM
As noted earlier, access to the dedicated area of memory SMM uses, the SMRAM,
is gated by the memory controller. In order to bootstrap the SMI handler, however,
it must be possible to load this memory area before the first SMI instance. This
is permitted by the D_OPEN control bit in the chipset: when set, this bit permits
access to SMRAM without being in SMM. After initialisation is complete, this bit
should be cleared and the D_LCK (Lock) bit set, rendering all the SMM control
registers read-only until the processor is reset.
This should be done very early in the system boot process by the system BIOS
before activating any peripherals or executing any other code to prevent malicious
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code using SMM as a hiding place; older BIOS implementations often failed to
secure the state properly during the boot process, leaving the way open for a
variety of SMM rootkits at least as far back as 2009 (Embleton, Sparks and Zou
2013).
Attacks on the code executing within SMM are also a possibility, including the
recently discovered Spectre technique to bypass bounds checking as discovered by
Eclypsium (2018).
4.5 Other uses of SMM
4.5.1 Security
Soon after malicious use of SMM’s isolation property was demonstrated, more
benign uses were found, with HyperGuard (Rutkowska and Wojtczuk 2008) in
2008, HyperCheck (Wang, Stavrou and Ghosh 2010) in 2010, HyperVerify (Ding
et al. 2013) in 2013 and a US patent on the concept being granted in 2014 (Barde
2014).
The TrustZone-based Real-time Kernel Protection (TZ-RKP) (Azab et al.
2014) applies the same concepts to an ARM system, using ARM’s TrustZone
mechanism in place of SMM. (TrustZone was created later, with a ‘Secure World’
entered by invoking a Secure Monitor Call exception.)
The underlying concept in each case is to generate then periodically verify cryp-
tographic hashes of critical structures or code (in HyperGuard’s case, by walking
the Page Tables to identify all executable pages marked for supervisor access).
At the time, this was not wholly sufficient since the processor could still execute
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non-supervisor pages with supervisor privilege; the later development of Super-
visor Mode Execution Protection (SMEP) by Intel (Ven et al. 2016) closed this
loophole.
The level of privilege at which code executes in x86 Protected Mode is determ-
ined by the two least significant bits of the CS (Code Selector/Segment) register,
so the code at a single address in memory may normally be executed at any priv-
ilege level without modification. This has its origins in the 80286’s implementation
of Protected Mode, prior to the 80386’s introduction of paged virtual memory: as
the two mechanisms were orthogonal, prior to SMEP a page could be user writable
(ring 3) yet run at kernel privilege (ring 0).
4.5.2 Forensics/Surveillance
Wang et al presented a set of SMM based tools for firmware assisted memory
capture for forensics applications (Wang et al. 2011). Unlike most capture and
analysis tools, this is theoretically undetectable to any guest code or intruder
except via ‘stolen’ clock cycles (which may potentially be disguised as normal
throttling/power saving) defeating counterforensic measures — a powerful possible
alternative to the usual VM sandbox approach for malware analysis.
4.6 SGX
Intel Software Guard Extensions aim to deliver similar benefits within the main
processor through architectural extensions, with an encrypted area of main
memory rather than one isolated by the memory controller hardware. SGX-Shield
(Seo et al. 2017) reviews the main limitations of this implementation and proposes
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an implementation of ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomisation, varying the
location of memory contents to make attacks more difficult) within this enclave
for additional protection from outside interference.
This isolation is a mixed blessing, providing a hiding place for less benign code
as well (Schwarz et al. 2017), while failing to protect against variants of the Spectre
attack (Chen et al. 2018b).
The TaLoS project (Aublin et al. 2017) has significant similarities to the final
experiment in chapter 5, in that it seeks to protect the encryption keys and traffic
over an SSL/TLS connection but using SGX rather than SMM to isolate the data
in question.
4.7 Other Platforms
SMM is not a concept confined to the x86 architecture alone. For obvious reasons
of ancestry and compatibility it is shared with the x86-64 (Intel® 64 and IA-32
ArchitecturesSoftware Developer’s Manual) and Itanium (Intel Platform Innova-
tion Framework for EFI System Management Mode Core Interface Specification
(SMM CIS) v0.9) architectures. As noted previously, ARM’s TrustZone can be
used as a substitute for SMM in the same protection methodology as HyperGuard.
The Cell Broadband Engine architecture powering the Sony PlayStation 3
(Murase et al. 2009) is a more interesting variant, with multiple PowerPC pro-
cessor cores in a single physical chip: one or more Power Processing Elements
(PPEs) and multiple Synergistic Processing Elements (SPEs). Each SPE has a
small local area of memory called the Local Store; when isolation mode is engaged
on an SPE, this memory becomes inaccessible from all other components regard-
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less of privilege level: nothing outside that processor core can access that memory
later, only pass messages to and from that core to request operations and receive
the results.
Early in the PlayStation 3 boot process, encryption keys and code are loaded
into an SPE which is then placed in isolation mode before the main hypervisor and
operating system code is even loaded; as a result, the encryption keys are robustly
protected from extraction by would-be reverse engineers (PlayStation 3 Secrets).
Consequently, attacks have focussed on compromising the earliest stages of the
boot process software, ultimately obtaining the key to sign their own replacement
‘level 0’ bootloader (Sony PS3 hacked “for good” —- master keys revealed) rather
than attempting to attack the architecture itself.
4.8 Software Alternatives
Various attempts have been made to deliver isolation between memory areas in
other ways in recent years:
4.8.1 Credential Guard — VM isolation
Microsoft recently released a software-only implementation of a similar approach,
Credential Guard, in which authentication keys are held in a dedicated virtual ma-
chine running on top of the Hyper-V hypervisor platform. This way, even a kernel
compromise of the main operating system is not sufficient to extract credentials for
reuse: no more ‘Pass The Hash’ privilege escalation once a system is compromised.
Only a compromise of the underlying hypervisor itself, or the hardware isolation
mechanisms, would suffice: a much smaller attack surface compared to the full OS
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kernel.
4.8.2 Process Isolation
The commercial content delivery network (CDN) Cloudflare has an interesting
implementation of TLS/SSL in two respects. First, they offer ‘Keyless SSL’ (Key-
less SSL: The Nitty Gritty Technical Details) in which the site’s private key is
handled remotely. Secondly, the SSL/TLS handling is performed in a separate
isolated instance of the Nginx web server (Incident report on memory leak caused
by Cloudflare parser bug) — an example of defence in depth which ensured that
when a bug was found in their HTML parsing implementation, the information
disclosed could not include site private keys, unlike with the widespread Heart-
bleed bug in OpenSSL (The Results of the CloudFlare Challenge) — only a kernel
or hardware level exploit could have exposed the key, not an application level one.
A version of this technique is also covered in the experimentation detailed in
chapter 5.
4.8.3 Encrypted Memory
TRESOR (Müller, Freiling and Dewald 2011) demonstrated that a general-purpose
computer system can be operated with almost all of main memory encrypted
while at rest, albeit with a significant performance penalty, using a modified Linux
kernel. There is some overlap with the research this thesis describes: TRESOR
uses the processor debug registers as an area of storage which cannot be accessed
via DMA. This was intended to protect against DMA attacks, among others, but
was not successful in that respect since this cannot protect the associated code:
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TRESOR-Hunt (Blass and Robertson 2012) demonstrated a successful attack on
this protection, using code injection via DMA - an attack which could not be
prevented through software mechanisms alone.
TreVisor (Müller, Taubmann and Freiling 2012) extended the techniques of
TRESOR to a hypervisor level in combination with techniques from BitVisor
(Shinagawa et al. 2009) to incorporate Intel VT-d (IOMMU) protection from DMA
attack.
On other platforms, the ARMORED (Gotzfried and Muller 2013) project ap-
plied TRESOR techniques to the Android operating system on ARM architecture
processors as a countermeasure to their own FROST (Müller and Spreitzenbarth
2013) attack, which used a cold boot attack to retrieve information from mobile
handsets running Android 4.0 despite the disk encryption employed.
4.8.4 Encrypted Swap
A cold boot attack can retrieve RAM contents for a brief period after a system is
shut down, but the system’s virtual memory persists indefinitely after shutdown
unless explicitly wiped. To avoid this, keeping that data encrypted is an idea
which long predates efforts to encrypt or otherwise protect the RAM, including
the encrypted swap space (Provos 2000) extensions to the UVM system (Cranor
and Parulkar 1999) originally proposed as an enhancement of the original 4.4BSD
approach. The much slower nature of disk storage meant the extra overhead of
this encryption was more widely accepted early on.
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4.9 Summary
SMM, although originally intended to deliver other functionality, is used in a
variety of ways relevant to security, both positive (to protect systems and data from
intruders or corruption) and negative (to escape detection, conceal compromises
and covertly capture information from a target). While SMM itself is a specific
Intel or x86 instance of this isolation mechanism, other platforms have analogous
mechanisms such as ARM TrustZone and virtualised isolation mechanisms, making
the underlying principle more broadly applicable. SMM and TrustZone may be
regarded as one extreme on a spectrum of context isolation mechanisms, with
direct inline handling of key material as the other extreme (no isolation at all)
and other options in between, such as separating key handling in either another
virtual machine (as Microsoft does for Credential Guard) or another Unix process
(as CloudFlare does) — the experiments described later study the performance
aspects of three points on this spectrum.
5
Methodology
5.1 Introduction
This chapter details a set of experiments which explore the initial hypothesis,
that SMM can deliver improved security isolation compared to other software-
only approaches such as process or virtual machine isolation.
The initial work consisted of a proof of concept exploit, section 5.2: a simulated
hardware backdoor in the x86 architecture whereby cryptographic keys would be
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captured then exfiltrated. This did not involve memory protection, but served to
explore and validate aspects of the later work as well as delivering a result in itself,
demonstrating a mechanism for bypassing security by circumventing the isolation
between processes.
For the performance assessment, two approaches are used: first, micro-
benchmarks, measuring the individual components involved in transitions to and
from SMM and kernel mode in isolation; secondly, to measure the overall perform-
ance of a web server using different isolation mechanisms, to be able to compare
SMM isolation’s performance overhead against versions with no isolation of key
handling and one which uses process-level isolation (which would protect against
process level compromise, but not a root or kernel level one as SMM isolation
does).
The experiments in section 5.3 investigate the performance aspects of using
SMM, in particular detailing the performance impact of each transition to and
from SMM compared to transitions to kernel space and back, which will be the
dominant factor in the overall performance of the SMM-isolated server developed
for section 5.7 later.
Finally, a set of three experiments described in section 5.5, section 5.6 and
section 5.7 test the performance and functionality of a simple HTTPS server ap-
plication with three different levels of key isolation: none (a control), process
separation, and fully SMM isolated key handling.
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5.2 Experiment 1: CPU Backdoor
This early stage work simulated a ‘backdoored’ version of an x86 processor. Intel
had recently released the Westmere microarchitecture (Gueron 2010), which ad-
ded hardware acceleration of the AES cryptographic functions to the preceding
Nehalem implementation. At this time, Edward Snowden had just exposed some
of the National Security Agency’s activities, raising new questions about the in-
tegrity of many products, the hypothetical question was posed (Bernstein 2013):
‘Thought experiment in malicious chip design: What would be the easiest way for
an Intel CPU to leak AESKEYGENASSIST inputs to an attacker?’
This work entailed multiple facets: the details of Intel’s AES implementation
(particularly, the AESKEYGENASSIST instruction mentioned, which expands
the raw AES key to the form used for encryption and decryption), some way of
capturing and storing this key even across context switches within the operat-
ing system or hypervisor, then constructing a covert channel through which the
attacker can retrieve the key later.
The simulation itself was constructed by modifying the Bochs open-source sys-
tem simulator (Lawton 1996), an instruction by instruction simulation of the x86
and x86-64 instruction set.
Initial key capture and retention was simple: a global state variable, loaded
with the key operand whenever the AESKEYGENASSIST instruction was called
with a Round Constant of 0. (AES has key sizes of 128, 192 or 256 bits; the first
128 bits are always used for round 0, with the remaining bits if any loaded in
round 1; for this proof of concept, 128 bit AES was sufficient, demonstrating an
approach which could easily extend to the 192 and 256 bit variants if desired.) In
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a physical implementation of this design, the variable would be implemented as a
128 bit register. Since this register is a concealed addition of which the operating
system and hypervisor have no knowledge, this state will persist across process
and virtual machine boundaries: only a full processor reset would clear it.
Exfiltration was via the floating point instruction set, a design partly inspired
by the Pentium FDIV bug (Pratt 1995): Intel’s flaw was included on all the
original Pentium chips, yielding an incorrect result once per 233 divisions, and was
not discovered for a significant time. An intentional version triggering much less
frequently would be effectively undetectable without specific prior knowledge of the
numerical parameters chosen. By triggering only for a specific pair of operands
(specifically, 1.91207592522993 × 2306 being divided by itself), only one in every
2128 possible divisions yields an unexpected result — in this case, instead of the
correct answer of 1.0, the next 32 bits of the last-used AES encryption key are
returned.
FDIV — floating point division — was chosen because it is not only an un-
privileged operation any code can execute, but also a basic primitive with a direct
counterpart in high level languages, including Javascript: performing this partic-
ular division calculation will lead to execution of that precise instruction, on any
Javascript implementation from the simplest interpreter to the most sophisticated
JIT.
With the target key captured in a non-privileged piece of Javascript, relaying
that over the Internet within a URL was trivial, appending it to an image URL
(Sutherland, Coull and MacLeod 2014).
Late in the course of this research, it emerged that Intel had in fact incor-
porated a version of this unintentionally (CVE-2018-3665: Intel Core-based Pro-
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cessors ‘Lazy FPU Restore’ Lets Local Users Obtain Potentially Sensitive FPU
State Information on the Target System 2018): the key was stored in a standard
processor register in a way which could later be retrieved by another process or
virtual machine despite intervening context switches.
This was an early exploration of the security aspects of the processor hardware,
serving to test and refine processor simulation techniques and implementation
details.
5.3 Experiment 2: Micro Benchmarking
Having experimented with low-level simulations, processor architecture and data
transfer between privilege levels and across isolation contexts, the next stage was
to investigate the performance on real-world hardware: SMM was documented to
provide robust isolation, but could it easily provide sufficient performance for a
workable web server implementation?
After prototyping work on the Bochs hardware simulation, a physical target
system was required for performance tests. A Lenovo ThinkPad X200 was obtained
and loaded with the Libreboot free software project’s variant of the open-source
Coreboot firmware (Libreboot), including its SMI handler code which could then
be freely modified in theory. An unmodified ThinkPad T60, with similar hard-
ware but retaining the original manufacturer’s BIOS, served as control, backup
and development system, allowing testing of SMM code under the Qemu-KVM
virtualisation system in conjunction with the related SeaBIOS project (SeaBIOS).
The first performance tests focus on comparing the raw latency penalty im-
posed by the architecture on transitions between userspace and either kernel mode
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or SMM as appropriate. This would give an early indication of the viability of the
overall approach to explore later, as well as determining how much effort might be
required to optimise the design for performance to be viable.
Each test consists of executing the function under test multiple times, recording
the elapsed time and calculating the time per iteration from that. To ensure
consistency, each test was repeated multiple times and checked for outliers.
Timing is measured in two ways: the system ‘time of day’ clock (which records
times in microseconds) and, for the T60 and virtualised system, the processor
Time Stamp Counter (read via the RDTSC instruction). On recent Intel processors,
including those in use here, the time stamp counter advances at a constant rate
regardless of power saving modes or clock speed, making this a useful timing
measurement. (On earlier implementations, the TSC rate varied with processor
speed, making this usage more problematic.)
The operations tested are listed in Table 5.1. Each set of measurements was
performed on each test system, to provide a baseline for interpreting performance
figures later.
The source code for the tests is included in B, with details of the processor
(E), Linux kernel (D) and compiler version (C) used in the tests. The test code
was compiled with level 2 optimisation (‘-O2’), for x86-64, in each case. To gather
statistical details about the distribution of each individual operation, the test code
optionally records the TSC value after each; for the overall operations, to avoid
the extra overhead, a consecutive sequence of runs is timed without recording
timestamps in between, by compiling with the BATCHONLY flag. (For the 1,000,000
iterations of getpid, 8,000,000 bytes of values are written out to memory, almost
four times the size of the L2 cache, although writing the values to disk is deferred
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Operation Purpose
NOP SMI Round trip to/from SMM
open-close System call requiring access to kernel memory
getpid Trivial system call to reflect minimal kernel transition cost
Table 5.1: Operations tested in micro-benchmarking
Model X200 T60 Qemu-VM
CPU Core 2 Duo P8400 Core 2 Duo T5600 Core 2 Duo T5600
Clockspeed 2.26 GHz 1.83GHz 1.83GHz
RAM 4 GiB 3 GiB 1 GiB
BIOS Libreboot Lenovo original SeaBIOS
Table 5.2: Test platforms for benchmarking
until after the timed portion.)
(Ordinarily the getpid function is accessed via vDSO for performance reasons
— the kernel puts a copy of the PID in the process’s own memory space and
provides a function to retrieve that directly, avoiding the userspace-kernel round
trip, but in order to measure that round trip the legacy system call is used here.)
The resulting timing figures are shown in section 6.2.
5.4 SMRAM and SMM
The overall goal is to implement a proof of concept server, in which cryptographic
secrets are protected within an SMM enclave, bearing in mind the needs for ef-
ficiency and security: in particular, minimal overhead in each transition to/from
SMM, and presenting a minimal attack surface on the SMM component while
enabling the application counterpart to run with minimal privileges.
As noted earlier, the Sony PlayStation 3 uses a similar approach to isolating its
cryptographic keys: one of the Cell’s Synergistic Processing Elements is isolated
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from the rest of system early in the boot process, functioning as a cryptographic
oracle exchanging messages with the rest of the system.
From the programmer’s perspective, this enclave will function in many ways
akin to a physical hardware device, passing messages in both directions via a page
of physical memory.
The starting point is a conventional web server, running as a normal unpriv-
ileged application (‘ring 3’) under Linux.
Entry to SMM requires triggering an SMI (System Management Interrupt).
Ordinarily, hardware interrupts cannot be triggered directly from user mode ap-
plications; first a system call would be required, to effect a transition to kernel
mode (‘ring 0’ on x86), then the corresponding kernel code would trigger the in-
terrupt on the application’s behalf. This, however, incurs additional overhead, two
mode transitions rather than one.
A more efficient approach is for the application to write to the I/O address
0xb2 as explained below.
Most modern processors implement a unified hardware memory map, in which
RAM and devices occupy the same address space; x86 has two distinct memory
spaces, a 64 kilobyte legacy space accessed via the IN/OUT set of instructions, and
a much larger space accessed via standard memory operations.
For devices mapped into the main memory space, the usual memory permis-
sions apply: the appropriate 4 kilobyte (or larger) page could be mapped with
appropriate permission bits set. The I/O space has different, fine-grained permis-
sions: the IOPB (I/O Permissions Bitmap) within the TSS (Task State Segment)
controls whether access is granted or not to any given byte within the I/O address
space. On Linux, the ioperm system call may be used to enable access to any
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specified I/O address.
To make use of the cryptographic enclave services, the userspace code must first
allocate and lock a page of physical memory, determining the underlying physical
address via the Linux /proc/self/pagemap virtual file and communicating this
to the SMM enclave at initialisation time. This shared page can then be used as
a mailslot for exchanging data: the userspace (ring 3) code interacts directly with
the SMM cryptographic code, without transitions to/from the kernel in between.
5.5 Experiment 3a: Protocol Verification
Through the use of Google’s established BoringSSL variant of the open-source
OpenSSL project codebase, much of the protocol-handling work required to deliver
a functional implementation of HTTPS was simplified. Other implementations in-
cluding the original OpenSSL were experimented with early on, but BoringSSL is
simplified and well-maintained making it better suited here, as CloudFlare con-
cluded for a large-scale use case with some similar elements to this work, notable
the private key handling callback mechanism as opposed to OpenSSL’s ‘engine’
approach: Make SSL boring again.
As a minimum, any server must have a signed ‘certificate’ which identifies the
server name and the cryptographic public key to be used for communication. In a
typical public deployment, the certificate will be signed by a CA such as Comodo
or GlobalSign which is already trusted by the common web browsers: the HTTPS
server at 2a00:1450:4009:80f::2004 presents a certificate asserting that it is
‘www.google.com’, GlobalSign sign the certificate asserting that this is verified1,
1In fact, GlobalSign’s certificate ‘GlobalSign Root CA R2’ merely asserts that ‘Google In-
CHAPTER 5. METHODOLOGY 48
and web browsers then trust this assertion as a result.
For experimental purposes, a ‘self-signed’ certificate is sufficient: the crypto-
graphic mechanisms are identical, but most client applications will alert the user
to the unknown identity of the server before proceeding.
For public demonstration and early testing purposes, two of the three most
popular web browsers provide good examples (Google Chrome has held a substan-
tial lead in popularity throughout the duration of this project, while Microsoft’s
Internet Explorer and Mozilla Firefox have alternated between second and third
place).
For automated protocol testing, the standard Unix utilities curl and wget
are both well-established, with the former in particular being noted for protocol
support: early support for the new HTTP2 protocol and Brotli compression al-
gorithm, as well as easy integration into various other platforms via the libcurl
library and associated language bindings.
Once basic functionality was established, more extensive protocol functionality
and compatibility testing is available via a variety of published testing tools. A
combination of two established test suites, the Qualys SSL Labs tool (Qualys 2014)
and textssl.sh (Wetter 2016) provide a substantial and well-regarded array of
tests for both compatibility with a variety of simulated client applications and
platforms and testing for various common implementation errors, such as accepting
weak or invalid cryptographic keys, obsolete algorithms or allowing inappropriate
key reuse. During development, the Wireshark packet capture/analysis tool was
also invaluable for debugging interoperability issues between the test server and
ternet Authority G3’ can be trusted, and that certificate in turn validates that in use on
www.google.com.
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client applications.
The goal of this experiment was to achieve a working server with demonstrated
broad client compatibility, through a combination of manual client application
testing and the automated test suites.
5.5.1 Tool: Wireshark
Wireshark is an established open-source network traffic capture and analysis tool,
originally released under the name Ethereal around 1998. The graphical interface
now features advanced packet dissection tools, advocated for TCP/IP teaching in
lab sessions (Wang, Xu and Yan 2010) — as it now includes the ability to interpret
SSL/TLS message structures in the same way, this makes it an excellent diagnostic
and testing tool for this experiment as well.
5.5.2 Tool: Qualys
The protocol parameters and configuration were largely chosen in accordance with
Qualys 2014 for best practice (with certain justified deviation: for example, OCSP
stapling and HTTP Strict Transport Security are not applicable when not using
publicly trusted certificates, and both TLS session reuse and HTTP keepalives
are performance enhancements which would just impede the performance testing
later). These configuration details and a set of known common issues are em-
bodied in the Qualys SSL Labs test suite, along with a system for simulating the
cryptographic handshake processes used by a variety of HTTP client applications
and host platform versions (for example, different versions of Google Chrome on
Windows XP, Windows Vista and others).
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5.6 Experiment 3b: Process Isolated Key Hand-
ling
This experiment modified the initial test bed HTTPS server to segregate the cryp-
tographic private key used outside the main server process. As noted earlier, this
separation provides some additional security protection (a compromise of the main
server application, as in Heartbleed, would no longer be sufficient to expose the
server key) akin to that presently deployed commercially by CloudFlare, reflecting
an intermediate position on the spectrum between the full isolation of SMM or
other mechanisms and unprotected key handling.
No new tooling was involved in this experiment, just additional coding (using
a page of shared memory and two file descriptor pairs from the pipe system call to
synchronise the interaction between the two processes) and re-running the previous
experiment’s interoperability tests to guard against regressions. (Any change in
code potentially introduces new flaws; ensuring at each stage that the code under
test is still a fully functioning SSL/TLS implementation, rather than ‘completing’
the benchmark without correctly performing all the steps involved.)
5.7 Experiment 3c: HTTPS Performance Test-
ing
This experiment tests the full spectrum of key handling options, including SMM
hardware-assisted key isolation, and studies the performance impact of using each.
In particular, measuring the number of requests per second handled in each con-
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figuration to identify the additional overhead contributed by the use of SMM to
isolate the cryptographic private key and associated code compared to the con-
trol option (no isolation at all) and the simple option (using a separate user-space
process for isolation).
To isolate the cryptographic aspects, the simplest possible HTTP situation is
ideal: a single very small piece of static content, being requested as many times
as possible per second with each request over a fresh encrypted connection using
a fresh session key.
In a ‘real’ web server situation, multiple requests will normally be sent over a
single connection, and the client and server will agree to re-use the existing keys
from a previous connection rather than perform a fresh handshake each time. This
will amortise the overhead of the initial cryptographic handshake across multiple
connections. (The server may also be hosting multiple web sites with distinct
keys, although major installations such as Google and CloudFlare share keys and
certificates across hostnames.)
Both of these factors make the measurements from this experiment a ‘worst
case’ scenario for the performance impact of SMM key isolation, leaving room for
improvement as discussed later.
The technical details of the overall design and operation of the server code are
described later in this chapter.
To quantify the performance impact of the Qemu-KVM virtualisation system
used to test the SMM version, the other two tests take place on both the bare
metal test system and under Qemu-KVM. Each performance test is run at four
different response sizes: 1k, 10k, 100k and 1MiB, to determine the effect this has.
The four sizes were chosen to cover a broad range of possible scenarios, including
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ID Description
0 Control - keys handled directly in-process, no isolation
1 Process separation - keys handled in separate worker process
2 SMM separation - keys handled in SMM
Table 5.3: Configurations tested in experiment 3
an extreme case of very small payloads in which the initial connection setup and
handshake will dominate, up to a size more likely to be representative of real
web content (MachMetrics 2018): a total page size of 2 MiB will be comprised of
multiple objects.
5.7.1 Tool: http_load
The free http_load tool from ACME (http_load) provides a simple HTTP load
generator with optional support for HTTPS.
5.8 Server Implementation
The long-established OpenSSL (originally SSLeay, by Eric Young) library provides
all the code necessary for both client and server SSL/TLS implementations, and
had been extended with ‘engine’ functionality for applications to make use of
hardware acceleration devices as well.
After some high-profile security issues highlighted long-standing maintenance
and code hygeine issues with this codebase, two forks were created to provide a
better service, LibreSSL (under the auspices of the OpenBSD project) and Bor-
ingSSL (under Google). Of particular relevance to this project is the addition
of SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD, allowing application code to make indirect use of
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a private key to which it does not have access – precisely the facility the SMM
enclave is intended to deliver.
Combining the BoringSSL library and the SMM cryptographic enclave creates
a single simple HTTPS-capable web server which can operate in three modes:
handling the public key cryptography and keys in-process (the ‘traditional’ ap-
proach used by most web servers today, where any server compromise exposes the
private key as in the Heartbleed bug), across a conventional Linux process bound-
ary (akin to the privilege separation added to OpenSSH in 2002 (Provos, Friedl
and Honeyman 2003), giving some protection) or using the SMM enclave (in which
even a root or kernel level compromise does not expose the private keys: the keys
are generated within SMM and never exposed outside this enclave). The relative
performance of all three modes can then be tested and compared, with minimal
artefacts from the difference between implementations.
5.9 Enclave Implementation
To create the SMM enclave itself, the code must be loaded early in the system
boot process. (Specifically, at power-up, the protected SMRAM area can still be
configured and accessed by enabling the D_OPEN bit, until the D_LOCK bit is set to
prohibit further access from outside SMM.)
Once loaded, this code is entered whenever the SMI (Systems Management
Interrupt) is triggered. On entry, the existing register contents are all saved within
the SMRAM State Save Map, so invoking SMI after loading the physical address
of the mailslot page into a register is sufficient to establish communication. (A
single 4k page is ample for passing signatures and public keys.)
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5.10 Certificate Signing
For a web server to be accepted as ‘valid’ for a given name, it must present a
signed certificate asserting ownership of that name, signed by either a trusted root
Certificate Authority (CA) directly, or an intermediate certificate which is itself
trusted.
This is a two stage process. First, a Certificate Signing Request must be
generated, containing a copy of the server’s public key and a signature using the
private key (the private key itself is never exposed).
Secondly, this CSR must be submitted to and accepted by the CA. Originally,
this was done manually using human verification of documents and credentials;
this still applies for ‘Extended Validation’ certificates, but for standard ‘Domain
Validation’ certificates this process can now be entirely automatic.
Specifically, the free LetsEncrypt CA allows ownership of a name to be verified
by publishing specific challenge response values in the DNS entries of the name
in question, without the server ever having to be publicly accessible. (This is
one variant of the ACME — Automated Certificate Management Environment —
protocol; other variants use the TLS SNI handshake process and HTTP messages
respectively to accomplish similar results via other protocols.)
This allows a public-private keypair to be generated within the SMM enclave,
issued with a valid certificate, then used to host a secured website for testing and
demonstration purposes, without ever exposing the key material externally.
For testing purposes, however, this external signing step is not necessary: a
‘self-signed’ certificate is sufficient.
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5.11 Performance Testing
As the cryptographic code is unmodified – a standard x86/x86-64 implementation
of the elliptic curve algorithms – the key performance metric is the additional
overhead introduced by transitions to and from SMM.
For context, this should be compared with the overhead entailed in a context
switch between usermode processes (as applies where the cryptographic code is run
in a separate process, as CloudFlare does in their content delivery network’s edge
devices) and user-kernel mode transitions (particularly after implementation of the
KPTI changes to mitigate the Spectre/Meltdown security issues). Experiments 2
and 3c quantify these.
For a better indication of the real-world performance impact, standard HTTPS
benchmarking — downloading static content over encrypted connections in each
configuration tested — gives indicative throughput speeds.
5.12 Security Testing
While web server performance testing is a well studied and long-established field
(Trent and Sake 1995, Banga and Druschel 1999), security is more nebulous. In this
context, the architecture is intended to provide isolation, and substantial literature
has already studied the various possible routes to accessing SMRAM (Wojtczuk
and Rutkowska 2009 — cache aliasing, MTRR manipulation; Furtak et al. 2014
— early BIOS implementations which neglected to enable D_LOCK timeously). It
can also be verified empirically that the SMRAM-protected data/code is not ex-
posed, even to the kernel (via a scan of the Linux /dev/mem device, which can
CHAPTER 5. METHODOLOGY 56
be configured to expose the kernel’s view of the entire memory space). Since the
SMM protected data has no functioning address except while the processor is ex-
ecuting in SMM, exploits such as Spectre cannot access this data. (Physical level
attacks such as RowHammer or address line fault injection could still be effective;
potential countermeasures to such attacks are discussed in section 3.4.)
5.13 Summary
A set of experiments is described which will serve to explore the functionality of
SMM in this context and test the hypothesis presented earlier, while also quanti-
fying the performance impact of each approach.
6
Results
6.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the experimental results obtained, with an explanation of
the testing methodology used to obtain them.
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6.1.1 Processor Level Backdoor
This experiment successfully demonstrated a proof of concept simulation of a
processor-level backdoor, exploitable from unprivileged code (including Javascript
executing within an unprivileged sandbox within a web browser) yet undetectable
without specific prior knowledge of the backdoor details.
For demonstration purposes, a file was encrypted using the command line
OpenSSL tools on an unmodified Windows XP virtual machine (as provided by
Microsoft). Cryptographic verification of the system confirmed it was unmodified,
and malware scans were negative, as the only modification was to the simulated
processor core itself.
After the encryption operation had been performed, the demonstration web
page was loaded in the Internet Explorer web browser. The page loaded normally,
with no abnormalities visible to the user — but the encryption key used in the
previous stage was now shown to have been covertly uploaded to the web server,
encoded within the URL of an image on the page.
The example code to exploit this appears in Listing 6.1, producing an HTTP
request as shown in Listing 6.2.
6.1.2 TLS — Protocol Verification
Once the HTTP-over-TLS (HTTPS) server was implemented, a variety of protocol
interactions were tested. Initially standard HTTPS clients (wget, curl, Mozilla
Firefox and Google Chrome) were used, and any issues encountered resolved; after
this, the more comprehensive industry standard test suite SSL Labs from Qualys
was employed, with results shown in Figure 6.3.
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Listing 6.1: Floating point backdoor exploit
// Perform the r i g g ed FDIV fou r t imes :
var a=1.91207592522993E+306/1.91207592522993E+306;
var b=1.91207592522993E+306/1.91207592522993E+306;
var c =1.91207592522993E+306/1.91207592522993E+306;
var d=1.91207592522993E+306/1.91207592522993E+306;
i f ( a !==1) { // Resu l t w i l l be 1 on untampered CPU
var k=a . t oS t r i n g (16 )
+ ’ , ’+b . t oS t r i n g (16 )
+ ’ , ’+ c . t oS t r i n g (16 )
+ ’ , ’+d . t oS t r i n g ( 1 6 ) ; // Concatenate the 4 va lu e s
// Now put that key in the URL o f the f i r s t image :
document . images [ 0 ] . s r c =’?n=’+k ;
}
Listing 6.2: Resulting HTTP request to server
GET / f l o a t b a c k . php?n=efbeadde ,77665544 , bbaa9988 , f f e e d d c c
HTTP/1 .1
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Figure 6.3: Qualys SSL Labs test results
The “T” score indicates a Trust issue — the test server is not configured with
a publicly trusted certificate, issued by a genuine Certification Authority such as
Verisign or LetsEncrypt — but all cryptographic and protocol aspects are correct;
the test suite proceeds to simulate the cryptographic handshakes of a variety of
common browsers. With the exception of Google Chrome on Windows XP Service
Pack 3, which experiences a handshake failure, all compatible clients negotiate and
connect correctly.
6.2 Micro-benchmarks
One important comparison is between the two full mode transitions (SMM and
kernel mode) — particularly with the KAISER/KPTI enhanced isolation added
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to the latter as mitigation to the Spectre/Meltdown exploits. (The getpid system
call was chosen as the most trivial, since it only copies a non-sensitive constant
integer; the open system call will be reading the file system cache, which is not
readable from user mode, so incurs greater overhead in a full transition to restore
access to kernel data.)
Since the secured server being developed in this project achieves the security
benefits by transitioning into SMM before performing each signing operation, the
relative performance impact of this change is indicated by the relationship between
the ‘signing’ and ‘SMM’ figures: the signature operation in isolation takes a little
less than the round-trip to and from SMM, 1.6 million processor ticks versus 2.4
million.
In normal usage getpid is faster than this, avoiding a system call entirely by
returning the process’s own copy of this value directly via a mechanism known as
vDSO (Virtual Dynamic Shared Object).
The timing figures are shown in Table 6.1. Unfortunately the X200 system
failed during testing, so further results could not be recorded; the remaining tests
had to be performed on the fallback system alone, the T60.
SMI calls caused the unmodified T60 control laptop to freeze; this appears to
be a known long-standing issue with the stock Lenovo BIOS (Ubuntu 2011).
The relative performance of the two hardware test platforms is indicated by
comparing the first two columns (indicating the T60 has just under half the speed
of the X200 on system calls), while comparing the two pairs of T60 figures (‘T60’
represents the test code running directly under Linux, ‘T60 Qemu-VM’ represents
the same code executed under Qemu-VM simulation) indicates the relative per-
formance penalty of the simulation system itself: approximately three orders of
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magnitude slowdown (a factor of 1,000). On the most trivial system call, the addi-
tional overhead of simulation dominates (as shown by the much smaller difference
between getpid and open/close times), but the relative performance of SMI invoc-
ation and open/close calls is more similar: 88 times slower in simulation versus
149 times slower on bare metal.
Statistics on the distribution of timings are shown in Table 6.2 and Table 6.3,
obtained from running the output of the code in Appendix B through the Perl
Statistics::Descriptive::Full library.
The maximum times for all operations are extreme outliers — around 3-5
million ticks on bare metal, around four times as high under KVM. Each indicates
the test application was interrupted during that operation for something of the
order of 2-20 ms.
The additional KVM overhead is most apparent when comparing the getpid
operations (a median more than 17 times slower), closing to a factor of 7 for
open-close and no discernable difference on cryptographic operations performed
in userspace.
The SMI transition overhead is less uniform, with the upper quartile more than
55% higher than the lower — an interesting characteristic, worthy of further study
elsewhere.
Operation X200 T60 T60 Qemu-KVM
Units µs µs TSC µs TSC
NOP SMI 448 Not available 1310 2.4m
open/close 3 7.1 3900 26 26k
getpid 0.4 1.1 620 21 12k
Signing Not available 878 1.606m 905 1.65m
Table 6.1: Execution time for system calls and SMI invocations
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Operation Minimum 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile Maximum
getpid 1133 1155 1155 1155 5211503
open-close 6347 6479 6512 6545 3776872
sign 1534995 1542285.25 1544378 1547757.75 2924856
Table 6.2: Execution time (TSC ticks) on bare metal
Operation Minimum 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile Maximum
getpid 20229 20295 20317 20361 33031357
open-close 44902 45397 45496 45595 29565196
sign 1536480 1543069 1546578 1596921 12533972
SMI 2235276 2326436.75 2921712.5 3618389 26339800
Table 6.3: Execution time (TSC ticks) under KVM
6.3 Macro-benchmarks
The performance recorded is shown in Figure 6.4.
The performance overhead of simulation as opposed to direct execution is ap-
parent. Across the range of request sizes tested, physical hardware is consistently
and proportionally faster than simulated. As the request size increases, the differ-
ence between SMM and other modes diminishes to less than 10% at the largest size,
one MiB. Reasons for this, and the implications, are discussed in subsection 7.2.5.
6.4 Summary
Experiment 1 demonstrated the feasibility of a well concealed backdoor existing
only on a hardware level, with no software modifications of any kind: a useful
result in itself, confirming the importance of either being able to trust your CPU,
or having robust precautions such as full airgap isolation in place, even after the
sensitive information appears to have been discarded: small amounts of informa-
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tion, such as the cryptographic keys being captured and then exfiltrated in this
demonstration, can be covertly retained indefinitely for later retrieval.
Experiment 2 determines the mode transition costs for SMM entry and exit:
non-trivial, but comparable to the time cost of the signing operation being protec-
ted, and substantially lower than for entry to Intel’s SGX particularly when trans-
ferring any amount of data to the protected ‘enclave’ environment. (SMM can
access shared data directly without performance penalty, while SGX’s transition
costs increase rapidly to 250ms for relatively modest buffer sizes.) Experiment 2
also validates the use of SMM simulation for later tests and development work,
since relative performance on non-trivial operations appears consistent within a
factor of two of bare metal execution.
Experiments 3a-3c combine to demonstrate a working HTTPS server and es-
tablish an upper bound on the performance or latency cost of isolating the keys in
two different ways, validating the original hypothesis about SMM’s suitability for
this technique. At the smallest extreme of payload sizes, where the cryptographic
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handshake for each new connection dominates, the additional SMM overhead is
of a similar magnitude; as the size increases, the impact of this extra overhead on
overall throughput rapidly diminishes.
7
Discussion
7.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses the experimental results described previously and describes
their implication in the context of this research, along with discussion of potential
further work building on this foundation.
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7.2 Analysis of Results
7.2.1 Experiment 1: Backdoor
The floating-point backdoor experiment demonstrated a useful outcome in simula-
tion: a hardware-only modification, exploitable from an unprivileged web page yet
undetectable without specific prior knowledge of the backdoor’s implementation.
7.2.2 Experiment 2: Microbenchmark
This experiment explored the performance impact of each transition round-trip
between SMM and userspace code, compared to that of trivial and non-trivial
system calls (which require an analogous transition to/from ring 0, kernel mode).
On a kernel with Spectre/Meltdown mitigation in place as detailed in section 2.5,
causing the memory mappings to be flushed on every transition, a non-trivial
operation (open and close a cached file) is almost a full order of magnitude slower
than a trivial one (getpid, which just copies the integer process PID from the
kernel task_struct). Executing an SMI on the first test platform is two orders of
magnitude slower still — 448 µs — but this is fast enough for over 2,000 transitions
per second: sufficient to justify proceeding to stage 3 without further performance
optimisation yet. (For comparison, Intel’s SGX enclave is reported in (Gjerdrum
et al. 2017) to take as much as 250ms with half-megabyte buffers, almost three
orders of magnitude slower than SMI entry, and substantially slower even without
significant data transfer — on an Intel Core i5-6500 CPU at 3.20 GHz with four
logical cores and 2×8 GB ofDDR3 DIMM DRAM, significantly faster hardware
than used for these SMM tests.)
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The simulation platform used for later testing was significantly slower than
running on bare hardware, but for non-trivial operations the relative performance
was still comparable.
Performance aspects and possible future optimisation opportunities are noted
later in this chapter.
7.2.3 Experiment 3a: Protocol Handling
Once developed, the experimental server was validated with a variety of common
HTTPS client programs (curl, wget, Mozilla Firefox and Google Chrome), then
tested more thoroughly using the Qualys SSL Labs test, as noted in chapter 6.
The server was operating without a publicly trusted certificate in place, but was
otherwise fully compliant, attaining an ‘A’ score for the SSL/TLS implementation
and completing all but one of the applicable simulated crytographic handshake
sequences successfully. (That exception was an old version of Google Chrome from
2016 on Windows XP Service Pack 3; as Mozilla Firefox on the same platform and
newer versions of Chrome on other platforms interoperate correctly, this issue did
not seem worthy of closer examination for now.)
7.2.4 Experiment 3b: Process-isolated Key Handling
This verified the feasibility and performance impact of segregating the private key
handling from other web server functionality, compared to the typical approach
of handling keys directly within the main server. When the Heartbleed bug was
discovered, allowing an attacker to read arbitary blocks of memory from within
the target process, this approach led to many keys being compromised and forcing
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urgent revocation and replacement.
By generating and holding the private key in a separate process, this would
have been mitigated: some confidential information could still have been exposed,
but the server keys at least would have remained safe — and the same isolation
approach could be extended for other sensitive data such as credit card numbers
or unencrypted passwords.
7.2.5 Experiment 3c: HTTPS Performance Testing
With a working HTTPS implementation using SMM security, full service testing
and comparison against the non-SMM options gives the best indication of SMM’s
performance impact in the worst case. (As noted later, multiple options exist for
reducing this impact if necessary.)
The relative performance on simulated hardware corroborates the micro-
benchmark results: performing the cryptographic handshake computations in
SMM approximately halves the rate at which handshakes are performed, causing
a corresponding slowdown on the smallest requests (where this aspect dominates
the overall server performance), falling to around 10% with 1 MiB requests.
The effect of size is to be expected: SSL/TLS uses two levels of encryption.
First, the connection is established using public key cryptography. This handshake
process negotiates two pairs of keys which are then used to encrypt and sign the
data exchanged, and has a fixed computational cost regardless of the volume of
data transferred later. Secondly, the request and response are encrypted and signed
using those keys, taking time proportional to the volume involved. So, on small
requests the former aspect dominates performance; on larger requests, the latter
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becomes dominant.
The performance shown on the smallest requests, 572 1k requests per second, is
also consistent with the bare metal SMM transition measurements from experiment
2 of 448 µs on a processor with approximately twice the performance (a higher
clock speed and faster memory bus).
7.3 Hypothesis
The initial hypothesis was that SMM can be used to protect sensitive data such
as cryptographic key material in a web server environment. The experimental
results shown previously demonstrate that the approach is technically feasible,
quantifying the performance impact — variable, determined by the size of objects
being retrieved, from a worst case 50% slowdown on very small sizes, falling to
10% at 1 MiB.
7.4 Performance
7.4.1 Batch signing
The proof of concept server under test here performs a single cryptographic opera-
tion on each entry to SMM, then returns immediately. For a busy server, batching
up operations and checking for additional queued requests before returning would
allow the entry cost to be amortised across multiple requests, boosting throughput
significantly.
For example, performing a batch of 10 signatures per transition could be ex-
pected to effectively reduce the transition overhead by 90% (at the expense of a
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slight increase in latency to assemble each batch), rendering the overhead negligible
(around 1%) for 1 MiB files.
7.4.2 Multiple cores/threads
In the standard Coreboot SMI handler, all cores receiving an SMI suspend execu-
tion until the handler routine completes execution on one core: the rest execute
a REP NOP or PAUSE opcode (f3 90), which halts execution on that core until the
next memory bus activity. The source code indicates this is done ‘for security
reasons’ (Google 2013) without elaboration.
Allowing concurrent execution of SMM and non-SMM code may have security
implications as implied by Google’s Coreboot documentation, but multiple cores
could be used to perform multiple crytographic operations in parallel to improve
performance without creating additional issues.
7.5 Hardware alternatives
The primary alternative to this approach, where enhanced security is needed com-
pared to direct key handling without extra isolation, is to use a dedicated crypto-
graphic hardware device. Some PCs and servers are now equipped with a TPM
(Trusted Platform Module), which provides a dedicated cryptographic and storage
facility, with a fixed set of algorithms, limited storage and minimal performance
(Bajikar 2002).
More advanced high-performance devices were commonly used for high-end
services (Anderson et al. 2006) for a combination of performance and security
reasons, but by 2007 software exploiting GPU acceleration reached comparable
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performance to dedicated hardware (Manavski 2007), eroding this advantage even
before mass-market processors were optimised for this.
For the most sensitive applications, an HSM still offers security benefits, par-
ticularly where performance is less critical — Certification Authorities use them
to handle their long-validity signing keys, where the economic damage from any
compromise would pose an existential threat to that company, the global DNS
root, banks. Being specialist hardware, pricing is rarely public, but recent eBay
listings offered two Thales devices for $3,999.00 and $5,999.00 for their nCipher
nShield 500 and 6000 units respectively.
This work, then, occupies a middle ground between the high cost high security
specialist devices and the more limited security protection of conventional software
implementations; as noted in section 8.3, this approach could also be combined
with the intrusion countermeasures of HyperCheck/HyperGuard in future to en-
hance this security.
7.6 Security
The focus of this research was on protection against various classes of memory
attack such as buffer overflows, DMA attacks and cache manipulation.
On the experimental hardware platform used (and the majority of PCs) the
BIOS is stored in a Flash memory chip which can be reprogrammed directly in soft-
ware with only root privileges, which would allow an intruder with such access to
replace or modify the SMM cryptographic code and thus replace the cryptographic
keys with ones they could access. There are two well-established mitigations for
this: either hardware write protection (for example, some Chromebook devices
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have a screw which physically connects or disconnects a pin on the Flash chip to
prevent unwanted modification regardless of access privileges); others allow write
access to the BIOS only during a short window after reset, so updates are first
downloaded to RAM, then the system is rebooted. At each boot, the existing
BIOS checks for cryptographically signed updates waiting in RAM, and applies
the update if present; this way, barring either compromise of the signing keys
(Leyden 2017) or an exploit in the update mechanism, any intruder could only
apply an authorised update to the BIOS, not their own arbitrary updates. Both
mitigations could, of course, be combined if desired.
The test platform uses a relatively old processor design, predating Intel’s ad-
dition of the RDRAND and RDSEED random number generation instructions. For the
purposes of these experiments a simple pseudo-random number generator was used.
For any real deployment a secure high quality random number generator should
be substituted to avoid introducing weak or predictable keys; the special-purpose
instructions are available within SMM and would provide sufficient entropy on a
processor supporting them.
The attack surface of the cryptographic code running in SMM is intentionally
minimal, performing no network access: any attacker, having already obtained
privileged access to the target system, probing the SMM code would have access
only to a signing operation, allowing them to provide a 256 bit value and request a
signature of that. They could use this to obtain their own certificate corresponding
to the protected private key (of course, any user connecting to the server also has
access to download the certificate in use), and complete handshakes using that key
as long as they maintained access to the compromised system — but this gives no
persistence to the attacker, since the key itself remains protected.
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7.7 Summary
The initial hypothesis from section 1.3 is confirmed by experiments demonstrating
a functional web server using cryptographic keys secured through SMM isolation,
and an indicative upper bound is established on the resulting performance penalty
through multiple benchmarks.
8
Summary, Conclusions
8.1 Introduction
The starting hypothesis from section 1.3 was:
Secure isolation can be practically implemented using only the long-
established Systems Management Mode mechanisms, giving better se-
curity isolation than existing techniques such as process separation.
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The performance impact of SMM has been explored both on bare hardware and
in virtualised form, and a proof of concept server demonstrated and benchmarked
successfully.
Even on relatively old legacy hardware, with additional overhead, the perform-
ance impact due to SMM isolation was not prohibitive — approximately doubling
the CPU time per handshake operation, causing a performance penalty falling from
50% on the smallest payload sizes (where the handshaking process dominates the
overall workload) to 10% at 1 MiB. Opportunities for mitigating this perform-
ance loss further are also identified, with micro-benchmarking figures giving some
indication what performance gain could be expected from this.
8.2 Dissemination
This work has already been depicted in a variety of conference poster presentations
and internal events. A paper was prepared and submitted for the ESSoS confer-
ence in Germany, but that conference was cancelled at short notice; revision and
resubmission of this paper for publication in an alternative venue is a promising
course of action.
The two main pieces of source code used in this project are incorporated as
appendices to this thesis; upon completion of the publication and review process,
the full project code will be publicly released to enable easy re-use in future devel-
opments.
Some practical issues encountered during testing have already been shared with
the LibreBoot team and are being addressed separately (in particular, the current
build tooling is fragile, easily getting into a state in which compilation no longer
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succeeds).
8.3 Further Work
This work has confirmed the potential for new uses of SMM in a security context,
beyond that established by work such as (Wang, Stavrou and Ghosh 2010) on
SMM protection of hypervisor and system integrity previously.
The experimentation also identified significant limitations in current SMM un-
derstanding and tools — since other research has focused so heavily on virtualisa-
tion, hypervisors and OS-level development, the lowest level firmware components
have been largely neglected. Bugs in this area, when found in open source pro-
jects such as Qemu or production equipment such as the Thinkpad T60 used here,
are often neglected and worked around by avoiding use of those features (for ex-
ample, disabling the SMM-related power management functions on the T60 when
encountered) rather than fixed, since these have been seen as low priority issues.
In recent months news such as Spectre and Meltdown have brought new at-
tention to this area, researching low level hardware bugs and protection. Unlike
reactive patching, SMM isolation provides proactive protection against issues of
this type — hopefully this will bring new attention and resources to this previously
overlooked area, improving security for us all.
8.3.1 Intrusion countermeasures
The HyperGuard/HyperCheck projects leveraged SMM as an integrity checking
mechanism to detect and alert compromises of a system. These integrity checks
could in future be incorporated within this work: not only would the keys in SMM
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remain protected, the compromise would be detected and appropriate responses
could be triggered, such as alerting the operator, clearing other data from the
system as a precaution and shutting down or suspending the compromised machine
to preserve evidence and prevent further exploitation.
8.3.2 Operation batching
As noted in subsection 7.4.1, significant gains in throughput are likely (in a server
situation) from performing multiple cryptographic operations per transition to
SMM and back: rather than passing individual requests immediately, combine
the requests into sets and process a full set each time. This would amortise the
transition cost across however many connection handshakes are being performed
in that batch, trading increased throughput for increased latency determined by
the batch size.
8.3.3 Multi core support
The SMI handler code in Coreboot pauses all cores on entry to SMM until the
one active handler completes processing. Google’s documentation indicates this
is for ‘security reasons’ without elaboration — isolation between cores is a sub-
ject of active research at present, so avoiding concurrent execution entirely is a
conservative response at the expense of some loss of throughput. With the im-
plementation of batched request handling, effective use of multiple cores could be
made without introducing new potential vulnerabilities since the code executing
on each core would be at the same privilege level anyway. Processor core counts
continue to increase, particularly in server environments, so the benefits here will
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increase accordingly.
8.3.4 Additional algorithm support
This project’s proof-of-concept code implemented only 256 bit elliptic curve sign-
ing, to demonstrate an application using SSL/TLS with ECDHA-SECP256R1-
AES256-SHA256, sufficient for contemporary web browsers and benchmarking
tools with HTTPS — generalisation to other key sizes and cryptographic al-
gorithms would improve practical applications of this work in future.
8.3.5 Other applications and protocols
Particularly with the inclusion of other algorithms, the key protection and handling
techniques demonstrated here could be applied to other protocols and applications
such as SSH authentication, cryptocurrency transactions or a credential store akin
to Microsoft’s Credential Guard (which uses a special-purpose virtual machine to
isolate credentials from the primary OS on desktop systems).
The two-level keying of DNSSEC (Eastlake 1999), in which each domain has a
persistent Key Signing Key (KSK, to which the parent domain contains references)
and a shorter duration Zone Signing Key (ZSK), could lend itself well to this
system: each DNS server could generate a fresh ZSK within an SMM enclave on
startup and export only the public key portion, with a more isolated (and hence
less vulnerable to attack) system holding the KSK’s private portion, needed only
to sign a fresh ZSK when one of the DNS servers is installed or reset. This would
allow DNS content to be updated more easily than the full offline signing currently
used for sensitive domains with low update frequency.
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8.3.6 Persistent storage
For the web server demonstrated in this project, creating a fresh keypair on initial-
isation is sufficient, but a mechanism for secure information persistence would be
useful for other applications such as authentication. This could be a remote server
(as in the case of credential caching, where a physically secured authentication
server issues the transient tokens for client devices to retain and reuse, perhaps
within a container such as Credential Guard), or a local component such as a or
simply a non-volatile storage chip with access gated by the SMIACT control line,
so only code executing within SMM can access it — similar to the mechanism
already used to guard the system firmware against unauthorised updates.
8.3.7 SMM experimentation kit
Firmware experimentation still has practical barriers to overcome compared with
application and operating system development. Early firmware inadvertently al-
lowed the replacement of the SMI handler code by leaving the D_LOCK flag
clear, enabling early SMM keyloggers and ‘bootkits’ to be installed without modi-
fying the system firmware itself — a security issue, hence urgently patched, but
also beneficial to experimenters. Restoring the legitimate uses of this without also
restoring the security problems would be useful: perhaps a physical key or cir-
cuit jumper to permit experiments. Alternatively, a system which made use of
SMM enclave code could be built with a cryptographic key, allowing signed code
to be loaded (with appropriate verification) to configure or enhance functionality
without replacing the system BIOS.
Open source projects such as Qemu, Bochs and CoreBoot/LibreBoot have
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been invaluable in this work; commercial hardware developers such as Intel have
high precision simulators of their hardware for internal development use, and the
MPTLSim project (Zeng et al. 2009) led to the open-source MARSSx86 project
(Patel et al. 2011), but this appears to have ceased development in 2012.
As noted previously in section 8.2, the public release of the software developed
in this project is planned, hopefully in the form of a ‘kit’ to facilitate future
firmware and SMM experimentation, making this much more accessible for future
academic and open-source development.
Appendices
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A
API Design
The design of the SMI component’s interface was driven by a preference for sim-
plicity and a minimal attack surface, derived after study of some existing uses of
SMI — in particular, a keylogger and the published information about simulating
legacy (pre-USB) keyboards for operating systems lacking USB support such as
MS DOS.
Required interactions:
• Generate keypair
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Offset (bytes) Size (bytes) Content
0 64 Public key (output)
64 32 SHA-256 hash to be signed (input)
96 32 Signature (output)
Table A.1: Message passing area layout
• Export public key
• Sign message
For this project, a single ‘mailbox’ page (4096 bytes) of memory sufficed. The
first two operations (generating a keypair and exporting the public key portion)
are combined.
For TLS/SSL purposes, signing a message (which may be of variable length)
consists of first hashing the message to produce a fixed-size message digest, then
signing that digest value with the private key.
A page of memory is requested from the operating system, locked in memory
with the mlock system call, then the underlying physical page address (determined
by looking the virtual address up in /proc/self/pagemap) is communicated to
the SMM handler. (Being ‘below’ the operating system, the SMM handler is not
subject to the virtual address mappings.)
The interface, as implemented in the do_smmcrypto function in the code shown
in Appendix F, requires loading a randomly chosen signature value (0x9a69ec01)
into the ECX register and the page location into EBX before triggering an SMI.
For the purposes of this work, a single TLS algorithm combination was chosen:
SHA-256 hashing with ECDSA on the SECP 256R1 elliptic curve, known as
ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256 — this is sufficient to provide compatibility with mod-
ern browsers for testing purposes, while the generalisation to different algorithms
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and key sizes is clear but not directly beneficial at this stage.
When first called, a keypair is generated and written to the start of the commu-
nications page. The server code uses this key to generate an unsigned Certificate
Signing Request, then calls the SMM handler a second time to sign this request.
For public use, at this point the signed request would be sent to a Certifica-
tion Authority, who would perform some checks and sign the request using their
own private key to produce a publicly-trusted certificate chain; for experimental
purposes, signing the certificate request using the same key again is sufficient,
producing a ‘self-signed’ key.
For each new network connection, the signing function is invoked again, after
writing the SHA256 hash of the message to be signed into the buffer. As noted in
subsection 7.4.1, overall throughput could be improved in future (at the expense
of some extra latency) by signing more than one message per invocation.
B
Micro benchmarking code
#define _GNU_SOURCE /∗ See fea ture_tes t_macros (7)
∗/
#include <sys / s y s c a l l . h> /∗ For SYS_xxx d e f i n i t i o n s ∗/
#include <sys / time . h>
#include <s t d i o . h>
#include <s t d i n t . h>
#include <s t d l i b . h>
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#include <un i s td . h>
#include <sys / i o . h>
#include <sys / s t a t . h>
#include <f c n t l . h>
#define uECC_CURVE uECC_secp256r1
#include ”micro−ecc /uECC. h”
stat ic uint64_t rd t s c ( ) {
unsigned int lo , h i ;
__asm__ __volatile__ ( ” rd t s c ” : ”=a” ( l o ) , ”=d” (
h i ) ) ;
return ( ( uint64_t ) h i << 32) | l o ;
}
#ifndef BATCHONLY
stat ic uint64_t ∗ l a p t i c k s ;
stat ic void i n i t t i c k ( int n) {
l a p t i c k s=mal loc ( ( n+1)∗ s i zeo f ( uint64_t ) ) ;
i f ( l a p t i c k s==NULL) {
f p r i n t f ( s td e r r , ”Out␣ o f ␣memory␣ f o r ␣ t i c k ␣
counte r \n” ) ;
abort ( ) ;
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}
l a p t i c k s [0 ]= rd t s c ( ) ;
}
stat ic void t i c k ( int n) {
l a p t i c k s [ n+1]= rd t s c ( ) ;
}
stat ic void t i c k s t o p ( const char ∗name , int n) {
FILE ∗ l og=fopen (name , ”a” ) ;
i f ( ! l o g ) {
p e r r o r ( ” open␣ l og ␣ f a i l e d ” ) ;
f r e e ( l a p t i c k s ) ;
return ;
}
for ( int i =0; i<n ; i++) {
f p r i n t f ( log , ”%lu \n” , l a p t i c k s [ i +1]− l a p t i c k s
[ i ] ) ;
}
f c l o s e ( l o g ) ;
f r e e ( l a p t i c k s ) ;
}
#endif
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stat ic int usage ( const char ∗name) {
f p r i n t f ( s td e r r , ”Usage : \ t%s ␣<mode>\n” ,name) ;
return 1 ;
}
stat ic int s i gn ( int i t e r s ) {
uint8_t pr ivate_key [uECC_BYTES ] ;
uint8_t publ ic_key [uECC_BYTES∗ 2 ] ;
// 32 random by t e s s t and ing in f o r SHA256 hash o f
pay load f o r benchmarking
uint8_t hash [ ]={0 x6b , 0 x73 , 0 x0c , 0 x63 , 0 xe4 , 0 x1b , 0 x17
, 0 x10 , 0 x13 , 0 x18 , 0 xe9 , 0 x94 , 0 x89 , 0 x75 , 0 x4c , 0 xfe , 0
xde , 0 x29 , 0 x7e , 0 xf7 , 0 xfc , 0 xe1 , 0 xef , 0 x62 , 0 xc1 , 0
x68 , 0 x7c , 0 x05 , 0 x52 , 0 xf0 , 0 x37 , 0 x0a } ;
uint8_t s i g n a t u r e [uECC_BYTES ] ;
uECC_make_key( public_key , pr ivate_key ) ;
#ifndef BATCHONLY
i n i t t i c k ( i t e r s ) ;
#endif
for ( int i =0; i<i t e r s ; i++) {
uECC_sign ( private_key , hash , s i g n a t u r e ) ;
#ifndef BATCHONLY
t i c k ( i ) ;
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#endif
}
return 0 ;
}
stat ic int s t_ s y s c a l l ( int i t e r s ) {
pid_t pid ;
#ifndef BATCHONLY
i n i t t i c k ( i t e r s ) ;
#endif
for ( int i =0; i<i t e r s ; i++) {
pid=s y s c a l l ( SYS_getpid ) ;
#ifndef BATCHONLY
t i c k ( i ) ;
#endif
}
return 0 ;
}
stat ic int do_smi ( int i t e r s ) {
i f ( ! ioperm (0xB2 , 1 , 1 ) ) {
#ifndef BATCHONLY
i n i t t i c k ( i t e r s ) ;
#endif
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for ( int i =0; i<i t e r s ; i++) {
outb (1 ,0 xb2 ) ;
#ifndef BATCHONLY
t i c k ( i ) ;
#endif
}
return 0 ;
}
return 1 ;
}
stat ic int st_open ( int i t e r s ) {
int fd ;
#ifndef BATCHONLY
i n i t t i c k ( i t e r s ) ;
#endif
for ( int i =0; i<i t e r s ; i++) {
i f ( ( fd=open ( ”/ e t c /passwd” ,O_RDONLY) ) !=−1)
{
c l o s e ( fd ) ;
}
#ifndef BATCHONLY
t i c k ( i ) ;
#endif
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}
return 0 ;
}
stat ic int t imer ( char ∗name , struct t imeva l ∗ tvs , uint64_t
t i c k s t a r t , int n , int rv ) {
struct t imeva l end ;
long int de l t a ;
i f ( ! rv )
t i c k s t o p (name , n ) ;
uint64_t t i ck end=rd t s c ( ) ;
ge t t imeo fday (&end ,NULL) ;
d e l t a=end . tv_sec−tvs−>tv_sec ;
d e l t a ∗=1000000;
d e l t a+=end . tv_usec−tvs−>tv_usec ;
f p r i n t f ( s td e r r , ”%s : ␣%d␣ i t e r a t i o n s ␣ in ␣%ld ␣us/%ld ␣
t i c k s ␣(=␣%ld ␣ns ␣/␣%ld ␣ t i c k s ␣ per ␣ c a l l ) \n” ,name , n
, de l ta , t i ckend−t i c k s t a r t , 1000∗ d e l t a /n , ( t i ckend−
t i c k s t a r t ) /n ) ;
return rv ;
}
int main ( int argc , char ∗∗ argv ) {
struct t imeva l s t a r t ;
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uint64_t t i c k s t a r t ;
i f ( argc !=2)
return usage (∗ argv ) ;
ge t t imeo fday (& s t a r t ,NULL) ;
t i c k s t a r t=rd t s c ( ) ;
switch (∗ argv [ 1 ] ) {
case ’ c ’ : // Cryp tograph i c s i g n i n g
ope ra t i on
return t imer ( ” s i gn ” ,& s t a r t , t i c k s t a r t , 1 000 ,
s i gn (1000) ) ;
case ’ o ’ : // open−c l o s e pa i r
#ifndef BATCHONLY
i n i t t i c k (1000000) ;
#endif
return t imer ( ” open ” ,& s t a r t , t i c k s t a r t
, 1000000 , st_open (1000000) ) ;
case ’ s ’ : // NOP s y s c a l l
#ifndef BATCHONLY
i n i t t i c k (1000000) ;
#endif
return t imer ( ” ge tp id ” ,& s t a r t , t i c k s t a r t
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,1000000 , s t_ s y s c a l l (1000000) ) ;
case ’ i ’ : // NOP i n t e r r u p t
#ifndef BATCHONLY
i n i t t i c k (1000) ;
#endif
return t imer ( ” smi ” ,& s t a r t , t i c k s t a r t , 1 000 ,
do_smi (1000) ) ;
}
return 0 ;
}
C
C compiler
C compiler version information, as reported by ‘gcc -V’.
Using bu i l t−i n sp e c s .
COLLECT_GCC=gcc
COLLECT_LTO_WRAPPER=/usr / l i b / gcc /x86_64−l inux−gnu/6/ l t o−
wrapper
Target : x86_64−l inux−gnu
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Conf igured with : . . / s r c / c on f i g u r e −v −−with−pkgve r s i on=’
Debian 6.3.0−18+deb9u1 ’ −−with−bugur l= f i l e : /// usr / share
/doc/gcc−6/README. Bugs −−enable−l anguages=c , ada , c++,
java , go , d , f o r t r an , objc , obj−c++ −−p r e f i x=/usr −−program−
s u f f i x=−6 −−program−p r e f i x=x86_64−l inux−gnu− −−enable−
shared −−enable−l i n k e r−bui ld−i d −− l i b e x e c d i r=/usr / l i b
−−without−inc luded−g e t t e x t −−enable−th r eads=pos ix −−
l i b d i r=/usr / l i b −−enable−n l s −−with−s y s r o o t=/ −−enable−
c l o c a l e=gnu −−enable−l i b s td cxx−debug −−enable−l i b s td cxx
−t ime=yes −−with−de f au l t−l i b s td cxx−ab i=new −−enable−gnu
−unique−ob j e c t −−d i s ab l e−vtab le−v e r i f y −−enable−l ibmpx
−−enable−p lug in −−enable−de f au l t−p i e −−with−system−z l i b
−−d i s ab l e−browser−p lug in −−enable−java−awt=gtk −−
enable−gtk−c a i r o −−with−java−home=/usr / l i b /jvm/ java
−1.5.0− gc j−6−amd64/ j r e −−enable−java−home −−with−jvm−
root−d i r=/usr / l i b /jvm/ java −1.5.0− gc j−6−amd64 −−with−jvm
−j a r−d i r=/usr / l i b /jvm−expo r t s / java −1.5.0− gc j−6−amd64 −−
with−arch−d i r e c t o r y=amd64 −−with−ec j−j a r=/usr / share /
java / e c l i p s e−e c j . j a r −−with−ta rge t−system−z l i b −−enable
−objc−gc=auto −−enable−mult ia r ch −−with−arch−32=i686 −−
with−ab i=m64 −−with−mu l t i l i b− l i s t=m32 ,m64 ,mx32 −−enable
−mu l t i l i b −−with−tune=g en e r i c −−enable−check ing=r e l e a s e
−−bu i l d=x86_64−l inux−gnu −−host=x86_64−l inux−gnu −−
t a r g e t=x86_64−l inux−gnu
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Thread model : po s i x
gcc v e r s i o n 6 . 3 . 0 20170516 ( Debian 6.3.0−18+deb9u1 )
D
Linux kernel
Linux kernel boot messages from the main test system used.
Linux v e r s i o n 4.9.0−8−amd64 ( debian−k e r n e l@ l i s t s . debian .
org ) ( gcc v e r s i o n 6 . 3 . 0 20170516 ( Debian 6.3.0−18+
deb9u1 ) ) #1 SMP Debian 4 .9 .144 −3 .1 (2019−02−19)
Command l i n e : BOOT_IMAGE=/boot /vmlinuz−4.9.0−8−amd64 roo t=
UUID=68e52d36−4090−4d3e−95ae−eebd7 f623a9e ro qu i e t
x86/ fpu : Legacy x87 FPU det e c t ed .
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e820 : BIOS−prov ided phy s i c a l RAM map :
BIOS−e820 : [mem 0x0000000000000000−0x000000000009e f f f ]
u sab l e
BIOS−e820 : [mem 0x000000000009f000−0x000000000009 f f f f ]
r e s e r v ed
BIOS−e820 : [mem 0x00000000000d2000−0x00000000000d3 f f f ]
r e s e r v ed
BIOS−e820 : [mem 0x00000000000dc000−0x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 f f f f f ]
r e s e r v ed
BIOS−e820 : [mem 0x0000000000100000−0x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 b f 6 c f f f f ]
u sab l e
BIOS−e820 : [mem 0x00000000bf6d0000−0x00000000b f 6d e f f f ]
ACPI data
BIOS−e820 : [mem 0 x00000000bf6df000−0x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 b f 6 f f f f f ]
ACPI NVS
BIOS−e820 : [mem 0x00000000bf700000−0x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 b f f f f f f f ]
r e s e r v ed
BIOS−e820 : [mem 0x00000000f0000000−0 x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 f 3 f f f f f f ]
r e s e r v ed
BIOS−e820 : [mem 0 x00000000fec00000−0x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 f e c 0 f f f f ]
r e s e r v ed
BIOS−e820 : [mem 0x00000000fed00000−0x00000000 f ed003 f f ]
r e s e r v ed
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BIOS−e820 : [mem 0x00000000fed14000−0x00000000 f e d19 f f f ]
r e s e r v ed
BIOS−e820 : [mem 0 x00000000fed1c000−0x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 f e d 8 f f f f ]
r e s e r v ed
BIOS−e820 : [mem 0 x00000000fee00000−0x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 f e e 0 0 f f f ]
r e s e r v ed
BIOS−e820 : [mem 0 x00000000f f800000−0 x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 f f f f f f f f ]
r e s e r v ed
NX ( Execute D i sab l e ) p r o t e c t i o n : a c t i v e
SMBIOS 2 . 4 p r e s en t .
DMI: LENOVO 1951CZ1/1951CZ1 , BIOS 79ETE3WW (2 . 2 3 )
09/12/2008
e820 : update [mem 0x00000000−0x 0 0 0 0 0 f f f ] u sab l e ==>
re s e r v ed
e820 : remove [mem 0x000a0000−0 x 0 0 0 f f f f f ] u sab l e
e820 : l a s t_p fn = 0xbf6d0 max_arch_pfn = 0x400000000
MTRR de f a u l t type : uncachable
MTRR f i x e d ranges enabled :
00000−9FFFF wri te−back
A0000−BFFFF uncachable
C0000−CFFFF wri te−p r o t e c t
D0000−DBFFF uncachable
DC000−DFFFF wri te−back
E0000−FFFFF wri te−p r o t e c t
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MTRR va r i a b l e ranges enabled :
0 base 000000000 mask F80000000 wr i te−back
1 base 080000000 mask FC0000000 wr i te−back
2 base 0BF700000 mask FFFF00000 uncachable
3 base 0BF800000 mask FFF800000 uncachable
4 d i s ab l e d
5 d i s ab l e d
6 d i s ab l e d
7 d i s ab l e d
x86/PAT: Con f i gu ra t i on [0 −7 ] : WB WC UC− UC WB WC UC−
WT
found SMP MP−t ab l e at [mem 0x000f6810−0x000 f 681 f ] mapped
at [ f f f f 9 0 8 d 0 0 0 f 6 8 1 0 ]
Base memory t rampo l ine at [ f f f f 9 0 8d00099000 ] 99000 s i z e
24576
BRK [0 x89934000 , 0 x 8 9 9 3 4 f f f ] PGTABLE
BRK [0 x89935000 , 0 x 8 9 9 3 5 f f f ] PGTABLE
BRK [0 x89936000 , 0 x 8 9 9 3 6 f f f ] PGTABLE
BRK [0 x89937000 , 0 x 8 9 9 3 7 f f f ] PGTABLE
BRK [0 x89938000 , 0 x 8 9 9 3 8 f f f ] PGTABLE
BRK [0 x89939000 , 0 x 8 9 9 3 9 f f f ] PGTABLE
BRK [0 x8993a000 , 0 x 8 9 9 3 a f f f ] PGTABLE
RAMDISK: [mem 0x35cc5000−0x 3 6 e 5 9 f f f ]
ACPI : Ear ly t ab l e checksum v e r i f i c a t i o n d i s ab l e d
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ACPI : RSDP 0x00000000000F67E0 000024 ( v02 LENOVO)
ACPI : XSDT 0x00000000BF6D1322 00008C ( v01 LENOVO TP−79
00002230 LTP 00000000)
ACPI : FACP 0x00000000BF6D1400 0000F4 ( v03 LENOVO TP−79
00002230 LNVO 00000001)
ACPI BIOS Warning ( bug ) : 32/64X l eng th mismatch in FADT/
Gpe0Block : 64/32 (20160831/ tb fadt −603)
ACPI BIOS Warning ( bug ) : Opt iona l FADT f i e l d Gpe1Block has
v a l i d Address but ze ro Length : 0 x000000000000102C/0x0
(20160831/ tb fadt −658)
ACPI : DSDT 0x00000000BF6D175E 00D467 ( v01 LENOVO TP−79
00002230 MSFT 0100000E)
ACPI : FACS 0x00000000BF6F4000 000040
ACPI : FACS 0x00000000BF6F4000 000040
ACPI : SSDT 0x00000000BF6D15B4 0001AA ( v01 LENOVO TP−79
00002230 MSFT 0100000E)
ACPI : ECDT 0x00000000BF6DEBC5 000052 ( v01 LENOVO TP−79
00002230 LNVO 00000001)
ACPI : TCPA 0x00000000BF6DEC17 000032 ( v02 LENOVO TP−79
00002230 LNVO 00000001)
ACPI : APIC 0x00000000BF6DEC49 000068 ( v01 LENOVO TP−79
00002230 LNVO 00000001)
ACPI : MCFG 0x00000000BF6DECB1 00003C ( v01 LENOVO TP−79
00002230 LNVO 00000001)
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ACPI : HPET 0x00000000BF6DECED 000038 ( v01 LENOVO TP−79
00002230 LNVO 00000001)
ACPI : SLIC 0x00000000BF6DEE62 000176 ( v01 LENOVO TP−79
00002230 LTP 00000000)
ACPI : BOOT 0x00000000BF6DEFD8 000028 ( v01 LENOVO TP−79
00002230 LTP 00000001)
ACPI : SSDT 0x00000000BF6F2655 00025F ( v01 LENOVO TP−79
00002230 INTL 20050513)
ACPI : SSDT 0x00000000BF6F28B4 0000A6 ( v01 LENOVO TP−79
00002230 INTL 20050513)
ACPI : SSDT 0x00000000BF6F295A 0004F7 ( v01 LENOVO TP−79
00002230 INTL 20050513)
ACPI : SSDT 0x00000000BF6F2E51 0001D8 ( v01 LENOVO TP−79
00002230 INTL 20050513)
ACPI : Loca l APIC addre s s 0 x f ee00000
No NUMA con f i g u r a t i o n found
Faking a node at [mem 0x0000000000000000−0
x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0b f 6 c f f f f ]
NODE_DATA(0 ) a l l o c a t e d [mem 0xbf6cb000−0 x b f 6 c f f f f ]
Zone ranges :
DMA [mem 0x0000000000001000−0x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 f f f f f f ]
DMA32 [mem 0x0000000001000000−0x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 b f 6 c f f f f ]
Normal empty
Device empty
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Movable zone s t a r t f o r each node
Ear ly memory node ranges
node 0 : [mem 0x0000000000001000−0x000000000009e f f f ]
node 0 : [mem 0x0000000000100000−0x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 b f 6 c f f f f ]
Initmem setup node 0 [mem 0x0000000000001000−0
x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0b f 6 c f f f f ]
On node 0 t o t a l p a g e s : 783982
DMA zone : 64 pages used f o r memmap
DMA zone : 21 pages r e s e r v ed
DMA zone : 3998 pages , LIFO batch : 0
DMA32 zone : 12188 pages used f o r memmap
DMA32 zone : 779984 pages , LIFO batch : 31
Reserv ing I n t e l g r aph i c s memory at 0 x00000000bf800000−0
x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 b f f f f f f f
ACPI : PM−Timer IO Port : 0 x1008
ACPI : Loca l APIC addre s s 0 x f ee00000
ACPI : LAPIC_NMI ( acpi_id [ 0 x00 ] high edge l i n t [ 0 x1 ] )
ACPI : LAPIC_NMI ( acpi_id [ 0 x01 ] high edge l i n t [ 0 x1 ] )
IOAPIC [ 0 ] : ap ic_id 1 , v e r s i o n 32 , addre s s 0 xfec00000 , GSI
0−23
ACPI : INT_SRC_OVR ( bus 0 bus_irq 0 g l oba l_ i r q 2 d f l d f l )
ACPI : INT_SRC_OVR ( bus 0 bus_irq 9 g l oba l_ i r q 9 high l e v e l
)
ACPI : IRQ0 used by ov e r r i d e .
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ACPI : IRQ9 used by ov e r r i d e .
Using ACPI (MADT) f o r SMP con f i g u r a t i o n in f o rmat i on
ACPI : HPET id : 0 x8086a201 base : 0 x fed00000
smpboot : Al lowing 2 CPUs , 0 hotp lug CPUs
PM: Reg i s t e r ed nosave memory : [mem 0x00000000−0x 0 0 0 0 0 f f f ]
PM: Reg i s t e r ed nosave memory : [mem 0x0009f000−0x 0 0 0 9 f f f f ]
PM: Reg i s t e r ed nosave memory : [mem 0x000a0000−0x0 0 0d1 f f f ]
PM: Reg i s t e r ed nosave memory : [mem 0x000d2000−0x0 0 0d3 f f f ]
PM: Reg i s t e r ed nosave memory : [mem 0x000d4000−0x000db f f f ]
PM: Reg i s t e r ed nosave memory : [mem 0x000dc000−0 x 0 0 0 f f f f f ]
e820 : [mem 0xc0000000−0 x e f f f f f f f ] a v a i l a b l e f o r PCI
d ev i c e s
Booting p a r a v i r t u a l i z e d k e rn e l on bare hardware
c l o c k s ou r c e : r e f i n ed− j i f f i e s : mask : 0 x f f f f f f f f max_cycles :
0 x f f f f f f f f , max_idle_ns : 7645519600211568 ns
setup_percpu : NR_CPUS:512 nr_cpumask_bits : 512 nr_cpu_ids : 2
nr_node_ids : 1
percpu : Embedded 35 pages /cpu @f f f f 9 08db f400000 s105304
r8192 d29864 u1048576
pcpu−a l l o c : s105304 r8192 d29864 u1048576 a l l o c =1∗2097152
pcpu−a l l o c : [ 0 ] 0 1
Bu i l t 1 z o n e l i s t s in Node order , mob i l i t y grouping on .
Total pages : 771709
Po l i c y zone : DMA32
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Kernel command l i n e : BOOT_IMAGE=/boot /vmlinuz−4.9.0−8−
amd64 roo t=UUID=68e52d36−4090−4d3e−95ae−eebd7 f623a9e ro
qu i e t
PID hash t ab l e e n t r i e s : 4096 ( o rde r : 3 , 32768 bytes )
Calgary : d e t e c t i n g Calgary v ia BIOS EBDA area
Calgary : Unable to l o c a t e Rio Grande t ab l e in EBDA −
b a i l i n g !
Memory : 3052708K/3135928K a v a i l a b l e (6268K ke rn e l code ,
1161K rwdata , 2872K rodata , 1424K i n i t , 656K bss , 83220
K re se rved , 0K cma−r e s e r v ed )
Kernel /User page t a b l e s i s o l a t i o n : enabled
H i e r a r c h i c a l RCU implementat ion .
Build−t ime adjustment o f l e a f fanout to 64 .
RCU r e s t r i c t i n g CPUs from NR_CPUS=512 to
nr_cpu_ids=2.
RCU: Adjust ing geometry f o r rcu_fanout_lea f =64 , nr_cpu_ids
=2
NR_IRQS:33024 nr_i rqs : 440 16
Console : c o l ou r VGA+ 80x25
con s o l e [ t ty0 ] enabled
c l o c k s ou r c e : hpet : mask : 0 x f f f f f f f f max_cycles : 0 x f f f f f f f f
, max_idle_ns : 133484882848 ns
hpet c l o ck ev en t r e g i s t e r e d
t s c : Fast TSC c a l i b r a t i o n us ing PIT
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t s c : Detected 1828 .235 MHz p r o c e s s o r
E
Processor
Processor information, as reported by the Linux kernel in /proc/cpuinfo.
p r o c e s s o r : 0
vendor_id : Genu ine Inte l
cpu fami l y : 6
model : 15
model name : I n t e l (R) Core (TM) 2 CPU T5600 @
1 .83GHz
108
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s t epp ing : 2
microcode : 0x57
cpu MHz : 1000 .000
cache s i z e : 2048 KB
phy s i c a l id : 0
s i b l i n g s : 2
co r e id : 0
cpu c o r e s : 2
ap i c i d : 0
i n i t i a l a p i c i d : 0
fpu : yes
fpu_except ion : yes
cpuid l e v e l : 10
wp : yes
f l a g s : fpu vme de pse t s c msr pae mce cx8 ap i c
sep mtrr pge mca cmov pat pse36 c l f l u s h dts acp i mmx
f x s r s s e s s e 2 s s ht tm pbe s y s c a l l nx lm constant_tsc
arch_perfmon pebs bts rep_good nopl aper fmper f pni
dte s64 monitor ds_cpl vmx e s t tm2 s s s e 3 cx16 xtpr pdcm
lahf_lm k a i s e r tpr_shadow dtherm
bugs : cpu_meltdown spectre_v1 spectre_v2
spec_store_bypass l 1 t f
bogomips : 3656 .47
c l f l u s h s i z e : 64
APPENDIX E. PROCESSOR 110
cache_al ignment : 64
addre s s s i z e s : 36 b i t s phys i c a l , 48 b i t s v i r t u a l
power management :
p r o c e s s o r : 1
vendor_id : Genu ine Inte l
cpu fami l y : 6
model : 15
model name : I n t e l (R) Core (TM) 2 CPU T5600 @
1 .83GHz
s t epp ing : 2
microcode : 0x57
cpu MHz : 1000 .000
cache s i z e : 2048 KB
phy s i c a l id : 0
s i b l i n g s : 2
co r e id : 1
cpu c o r e s : 2
ap i c i d : 1
i n i t i a l a p i c i d : 1
fpu : yes
fpu_except ion : yes
cpuid l e v e l : 10
wp : yes
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f l a g s : fpu vme de pse t s c msr pae mce cx8 ap i c
sep mtrr pge mca cmov pat pse36 c l f l u s h dts acp i mmx
f x s r s s e s s e 2 s s ht tm pbe s y s c a l l nx lm constant_tsc
arch_perfmon pebs bts rep_good nopl aper fmper f pni
dte s64 monitor ds_cpl vmx e s t tm2 s s s e 3 cx16 xtpr pdcm
lahf_lm k a i s e r tpr_shadow dtherm
bugs : cpu_meltdown spectre_v1 spectre_v2
spec_store_bypass l 1 t f
bogomips : 3656 .47
c l f l u s h s i z e : 64
cache_al ignment : 64
addre s s s i z e s : 36 b i t s phys i c a l , 48 b i t s v i r t u a l
power management :
F
Multi-mode HTTPS server code
/∗
Or i g i na l TLS s e r v e r example : h t t p s :// w i k i . o p en s s l . org /
index . php/Simple_TLS_Server
C e r t i f i c a t e hand l ing : h t t p s :// s t a c k o v e r f l ow . com/ qu e s t i o n s
/16364522/how−do−i−crea te−a−s e l f −s igned−c e r t i f i c a t e −in
−openss l−p rog rama t i c a l l y−i−e−not
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APPENDIX F. MULTI-MODE HTTPS SERVER CODE 113
Main JS changes :
Sign wi th the key BEFORE d i s c a r d i n g i t ( yes , RLY)
Stub out p t h r ead s − not used , a vo i d s SIGILL problem ea r l y
in dev
Enable SO_REUSEADDR
E l l i p t i c curve i n f o from :
h t t p :// fm4dd . com/ open s s l / e c k e y c r e a t e . htm
CSR code from :
h t t p :// op en s s l . 6 102 . n7 . nabb l e . com/ crea te−c e r t i f i c a t e −
r eque s t−programmat ica l l y−using−OpenSSL−API−td29197 . html
∗/
#define PAGE_SHIFT 12
#ifde f __GNUC__
# define UNUSED(x ) UNUSED_ ## x __attribute__ ( (__unused__
) )
#else
# define UNUSED(x ) UNUSED_ ## x
#endif
#include <s tdd e f . h>
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#include ”micro−ecc /uECC. h”
#include ” sha−256.h”
#include <s t d i o . h>
#include <s t r i n g . h>
#include <un i s td . h>
#include <sys / so cke t . h>
#include <arpa / i n e t . h>
#include <open s s l / s s l . h>
#include <open s s l / e r r . h>
#include <open s s l / x509v3 . h>
#include <sys /mman. h>
#ifde f __linux__
#include <mal loc . h>
#include <sys / types . h>
#endif
#include <sys / s t a t . h>
#include <f c n t l . h>
// JS p ro t o t y p e f o r OPENSSL_cpuid_setup and
x509_diges t_s ign_a lgor i thm
void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup (void ) ;
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int x509_digest_s ign_algor i thm (EVP_MD_CTX ∗ctx , X509_ALGOR
∗ a l g o r ) ;
X509 ∗ owncert ;
uint8_t pr ivate_key [uECC_BYTES ] ;
uint8_t publ ic_key [uECC_BYTES∗ 2 ] ;
EC_KEY ∗pubkey ;
#ifde f USE_SMM
void ∗ ma i l s l o t=NULL;
#i f USE_SMM == 1
int i p c p i p e s [ 2 ] [ 2 ] ;
#endif
#i f USE_SMM == 2
stat ic uint8_t ∗commpage=0;
uint32_t pagenum ;
#endif
#endif
int s i g l e n ( uint8_t ∗out , uint8_t s i g [uECC_BYTES∗2 ] ) {
int l e n =0;
out [0 ]=0 x30 ;
out [ 2 ]=2 ;
l en =3;
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out [ l en++]=uECC_BYTES;
i f ( s i g [0 ] >127) {
out [ len −1]++;
out [ l en++]=0; // Zero pad f o r s i g n i n g hack
}
memcpy( out+len , s i g ,uECC_BYTES) ;
l en+=uECC_BYTES;
out [ l en++]=2;
out [ l en++]=uECC_BYTES;
i f ( s i g [uECC_BYTES]>127) {
out [ len −1]++;
out [ l en++]=0; // Zero pad f o r s i g n i n g hack
}
memcpy( out+len , s i g+uECC_BYTES,uECC_BYTES) ;
l en+=uECC_BYTES;
out [1 ]= len −2;
return l e n ;
}
#ifde f USE_SMM
#i f USE_SMM == 1
int worker_r , worker_w ;
uint8_t worker_c ;
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void keyworker ( int r , int w) {
uint8_t c= ’ \0 ’ ;
uECC_make_key( public_key , pr ivate_key ) ;
memcpy( ma i l s l o t , public_key ,uECC_BYTES∗2) ;
i f ( wr i t e (w,&c , s i zeo f ( c ) )==−1) {
pe r r o r ( ” wr i t e ␣IPC␣ i n i t ” ) ;
return ;
}
while ( 1 ) {
switch ( read ( r ,&c , s i zeo f ( c ) ) ) {
case −1:
p e r r o r ( ” read ” ) ;
// Fa l l t hrough
case 0 : // EOF: shutdown g r a c e f u l l y
return ;
default : // Work to do ! Sign the message in
ma i l s l o t
uECC_sign ( private_key , ma i l s l o t , ma i l s l o t +32) ;
i f ( wr i t e (w,&c , s i zeo f ( c ) )==−1) {
pe r r o r ( ” wr i t e ␣IPC” ) ;
return ;
}
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}
}
}
#endif
#i f USE_SMM == 2
int do_smmcrypto (void ) {
int r e s u l t ;
/∗ Ca l l SMI by w r i t i n g 0x01 to I /O 0xb2 ∗/
__asm__ vo lat i l e (
”movl␣ $0x9a69ec01 ,%%ecx \n\ t ”
”movl␣%1,%%ebx\n\ t ”
” outb␣%%al , $0xb2\n\ t ”
”movl␣%%ebx ,%0”
: ”=r ” ( r e s u l t )
: ” r ” ( pagenum)
: ” ecx ” , ” ebx ” , ”memory” ) ;
f p r i n t f ( s td e r r , ”SMM␣ re turned ␣%08x\n” , r e s u l t ) ;
return r e s u l t ;
}
#endif
enum s s l_pr ivate_key_resu l t_t smm_sign (
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SSL ∗ UNUSED( s s l ) ,
u int8_t ∗out ,
s i z e_t ∗out_len ,
s i z e_t max_out ,
uint16_t s ignature_a lgor i thm ,
const uint8_t ∗ in ,
s i z e_t in_len
) {
#i f USE_SMM == 0
uint8_t hash [ 3 2 ] , s i g [uECC_BYTES∗ 2 ] ;
#endif
switch ( s i gna tu re_a lgo r i thm ) {
case SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256 :
f p r i n t f ( s td e r r , ” s i gn (%lu ␣ bytes , ␣ a l g ␣%d) \n” ,max_out ,
s i gna ture_a lgo r i thm ) ;
#i f USE_SMM == 0
calc_sha_256 ( hash , in , in_len ) ;
uECC_sign ( private_key , hash , s i g ) ;
∗ out_len=s i g l e n ( out , s i g ) ;
#e l i f USE_SMM == 1 // Use worker p roce s s
calc_sha_256 ( ma i l s l o t , in , in_len ) ;
i f ( wr i t e (worker_w ,&worker_c , s i zeo f ( worker_c ) ) != s i zeo f
( worker_c ) ) {
p e r r o r ( ”Worker␣IPC␣ e r r o r ” ) ;
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return s s l_p r i v a t e_key_ fa i l u r e ;
}
i f ( read ( worker_r ,&worker_c , s i zeo f ( worker_c ) ) != s i zeo f (
worker_c ) ) {
p e r r o r ( ”Worker␣IPC␣ e r r o r ” ) ;
return s s l_p r i v a t e_key_ fa i l u r e ;
}
∗ out_len=s i g l e n ( out , ma i l s l o t +32) ;
#e l i f USE_SMM == 2
calc_sha_256 ( commpage+(uECC_BYTES∗2) , in , in_len ) ;
do_smmcrypto ( ) ; // SMI magic pu t s s i g n a t u r e in
commpage now
∗ out_len=s i g l e n ( out , commpage+(uECC_BYTES∗2)+32) ;
#endif
return s s l_pr ivate_key_succe s s ;
break ;
default :
f p r i n t f ( s td e r r , ”Unknown␣ s i g n a t u r e ␣ a lgo r i thm ␣ reque s t ed :
␣0x%04x\n” , s i gna tur e_a lgo r i thm ) ;
return s s l_p r i v a t e_key_ fa i l u r e ;
}
}
enum s s l_pr ivate_key_resu l t_t smm_decrypt (SSL ∗ UNUSED( s s l
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) , uint8_t ∗ UNUSED( out ) ,
s i z e_t ∗ UNUSED( out_len ) , s i z e_t max_out ,
const uint8_t ∗ UNUSED( in ) , s i z e_t in_len ) {
f p r i n t f ( s td e r r , ” decrypt(%lu ␣ in ,% lu ␣ out ) \n” , in_len ,
max_out ) ;
return s s l_p r i v a t e_key_ fa i l u r e ;
}
enum s s l_pr ivate_key_resu l t_t smm_complete (SSL ∗ UNUSED(
s s l ) , u int8_t ∗ UNUSED( out ) ,
s i z e_t ∗ UNUSED( out_len ) , s i z e_t UNUSED(max_out ) ) {
return s s l_p r i v a t e_key_ fa i l u r e ;
}
const SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD smm_method = {
smm_sign ,
smm_decrypt ,
smm_complete
} ;
#endif
int c r ea t e_socke t ( int port )
{
int s , r eu s e =1;
struct sockaddr_in addr ;
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addr . s in_fami ly = AF_INET;
addr . s in_port = htons ( port ) ;
addr . s in_addr . s_addr = hton l (INADDR_ANY) ;
s = socke t (AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0) ;
i f ( s < 0) {
pe r r o r ( ”Unable ␣ to ␣ c r e a t e ␣ s o cke t ” ) ;
e x i t (EXIT_FAILURE) ;
}
i f ( s e t s o ckop t ( s ,SOL_SOCKET,SO_REUSEADDR,& reuse , s i zeo f
( r eu s e ) ) ) {
p e r r o r ( ” s e t s o ckop t (SO_REUSEADDR) ” ) ;
e x i t (EXIT_FAILURE) ;
}
i f ( bind ( s , ( struct sockaddr ∗)&addr , s i zeo f ( addr ) ) <
0) {
pe r r o r ( ”Unable ␣ to ␣ bind ” ) ;
e x i t (EXIT_FAILURE) ;
}
i f ( l i s t e n ( s , 1) < 0) {
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pe r r o r ( ”Unable ␣ to ␣ l i s t e n ” ) ;
e x i t (EXIT_FAILURE) ;
}
return s ;
}
void i n i t_op en s s l ( )
{
SSL_load_error_str ings ( ) ;
OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms ( ) ;
}
void c l eanup_openss l ( )
{
EVP_cleanup ( ) ;
}
SSL_CTX ∗ crea t e_context ( )
{
const SSL_METHOD ∗method ;
SSL_CTX ∗ ctx ;
method = SSLv23_server_method ( ) ;
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ctx = SSL_CTX_new(method ) ;
i f ( ! c tx ) {
p e r r o r ( ”Unable ␣ to ␣ c r e a t e ␣SSL␣ context ” ) ;
ERR_print_errors_fp ( s t d e r r ) ;
e x i t (EXIT_FAILURE) ;
}
#ifde f USE_SMM
SSL_CTX_set_private_key_method ( ctx ,&smm_method) ;
#endif
return ctx ;
}
EVP_PKEY ∗PrivateKey = NULL;
EVP_PKEY ∗newerkey ( ) {
#ifde f USE_SMM
uint8_t o c t e t b u f f [1+uECC_BYTES∗2]={0x4 } ;
#endif
EVP_PKEY ∗ pr ivkey=EVP_PKEY_new( ) ;
EC_KEY ∗k ;
int grp=OBJ_txt2nid ( ” prime256v1 ” ) ;
// i n t grp=OBJ_txt2nid (” bra inpoo lP256r1 ”) ;
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k=EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name( grp ) ;
#ifde f USE_SMM
// JS SMM b i t s l a t e r 2018−08−06:
const EC_GROUP ∗pubkeygroup=EC_KEY_get0_group( k ) ;
EC_POINT ∗ pubkeypoint=EC_POINT_new( pubkeygroup ) ;
memcpy( o c t e t b u f f +1, public_key ,uECC_BYTES∗2) ;
EC_POINT_oct2point ( pubkeygroup , pubkeypoint , o c t e t bu f f ,1+
uECC_BYTES∗2 ,NULL) ;
#endif
i f ( ! k ) {
f p r i n t f ( s td e r r , ”ECC␣ i n i t ␣ f a i l e d ␣ f o r ␣ group␣%d␣with ␣
e r r o r ␣%s \n” , grp , ERR_error_string ( ERR_get_error ( ) ,
NULL) ) ;
return NULL;
}
EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag (k ,OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE) ;
#ifde f USE_SMM
EC_KEY_set_public_key (k , pubkeypoint ) ;
// X509_PUBKEY_set0_param( pub , OBJ_nid2obj (
NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey ) )
#else
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i f ( ! EC_KEY_generate_key ( k ) ) {
f p r i n t f ( s td e r r , ”ECC␣keygen ␣ f a i l e d \n” ) ;
return NULL;
}
#endif
i f ( ! EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY( pr ivkey , k ) ) {
f p r i n t f ( s td e r r , ”ECC␣ conve r s i on ␣ f a i l e d \n” ) ;
return NULL;
}
return pr ivkey ;
}
EVP_PKEY ∗newkey ( ) {
RSA ∗KeyPair ;
BIGNUM ∗BigNumber = NULL;
// Create the RSA key pa i r o b j e c t
KeyPair = RSA_new( ) ;
i f ( ! KeyPair )
return NULL;
// Create the b i g number o b j e c t
BigNumber = BN_new( ) ;
i f ( ! BigNumber )
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return NULL;
// Set t he word
i f ( ! BN_set_word (BigNumber , 65537) )
return NULL;
// Generate the key pa i r ; l o t s o f computes here
i f ( ! RSA_generate_key_ex ( KeyPair , 4096 , BigNumber , NULL
) )
return NULL;
// Now we need a p r i v a t e key o b j e c t
PrivateKey = EVP_PKEY_new( ) ;
i f ( ! PrivateKey )
return NULL;
// Assign the key pa i r to the p r i v a t e key o b j e c t
i f ( ! EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA ( PrivateKey , KeyPair ) )
return NULL;
// KeyPair now be l on g s to PrivateKey , so don ’ t c l ean i t
up s e p a r a t e l y
KeyPair = NULL;
return PrivateKey ;
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}
int s i g n c e r t (X509 ∗Cert ) {
EVP_MD_CTX ctx ;
void ∗ asn=Cert−>ce r t_ in f o ;
ASN1_BIT_STRING ∗ s i g n a t u r e=Cert−>s i gna t u r e ;
X509_ALGOR ∗ a l go r 1=Cert−>cer t_ in fo−>s igna tu r e , ∗ a l g o r 2=
Cert−>s ig_a lg ;
const ASN1_ITEM ∗ i t=ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CINF) ;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx ) ;
Cert−>cer t_ in fo−>enc . mod i f i ed = 1 ;
// Sign i t w i th SHA−256 − i n l i n e d v a r i an t o f X509_sign
f o r now
i f ( ! EVP_DigestSignInit (&ctx , NULL, EVP_sha256 ( ) , NULL,
PrivateKey ) ) {
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx ) ;
return 0 ;
}
unsigned char ∗buf_in = NULL, ∗buf_out = NULL;
s i z e_t i n l = 0 , ou t l = 0 ;
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/∗ Write out t he r e qu e s t e d cop i e s o f t he
A l g o r i t hm I d e n t i f i e r . ∗/
i f ( a l g o r 1 && ! x509_digest_s ign_algor i thm(&ctx , a l g o r 1 )
) {
goto e r r ;
}
i f ( a l g o r 2 && ! x509_digest_s ign_algor i thm(&ctx , a l g o r 2 )
) {
goto e r r ;
}
i n l = ASN1_item_i2d ( asn , &buf_in , i t ) ;
ou t l = EVP_PKEY_size( PrivateKey ) ;
buf_out = OPENSSL_malloc ( ( unsigned int ) ou t l ) ;
i f ( ( buf_in == NULL) | | ( buf_out == NULL) ) {
ou t l = 0 ;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509 , ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE) ;
goto e r r ;
}
#ifde f USE_SMM
smm_sign (NULL, buf_out ,& out l , out l ,
SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256 , buf_in , i n l ) ;
APPENDIX F. MULTI-MODE HTTPS SERVER CODE 130
#else
i f ( ! EVP_DigestSign(&ctx , buf_out , &out l , buf_in , i n l ) )
{
ou t l = 0 ;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509 , ERR_R_EVP_LIB) ;
goto e r r ;
}
#endif
i f ( s i gna tu r e−>data != NULL)
OPENSSL_free ( s i gna tu r e−>data ) ;
s i gna tu r e−>data = buf_out ;
buf_out = NULL;
s i gna tu r e−>leng th = ou t l ;
/∗
∗ In the i n t e r e s t s o f c ompa t i b i l i t y , I ’ l l make sure
t h a t t he b i t s t r i n g
∗ has a ’ not−used b i t s ’ v a l u e o f 0
∗/
s i gna tu r e−>f l a g s &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07
) ;
s i gna tu r e−>f l a g s |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT;
e r r :
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx ) ;
OPENSSL_free ( buf_in ) ;
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OPENSSL_free ( buf_out ) ;
return ( ou t l ) ;
}
const unsigned char c e r t i s s u a n c e [ ]= ” C e r t i f i c a t e ␣ I s suanc e ” ;
X509 ∗ C r e a t eC e r t i f i c a t e ( const unsigned char ∗Country ,
const unsigned char ∗ State , const unsigned char ∗
Loca l i t y , const unsigned char ∗OrganizationName , const
unsigned char ∗CommonName, const unsigned char ∗DNSName
, int S e r i a l , int DaysValid )
{
X509 ∗Cert = NULL;
X509_NAME ∗Name = NULL;
RSA ∗KeyPair = NULL;
BIGNUM ∗BigNumber = NULL;
int Succe s s = 0 ;
// Faux loop . . .
do {
// Create the c e r t i f i c a t e o b j e c t
Cert = X509_new ( ) ;
i f ( ! Cert )
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break ;
// Set v e r s i on 2 , and g e t v e r s i on 3
X509_set_version ( Cert , 2) ;
// Set t he c e r t i f i c a t e ’ s p r o p e r t i e s
ASN1_INTEGER_set ( X509_get_serialNumber ( Cert ) , S e r i a l
) ;
X509_gmtime_adj ( X509_get_notBefore ( Cert ) , 0) ;
X509_gmtime_adj ( X509_get_notAfter ( Cert ) , ( long ) (60 ∗
60 ∗ 24 ∗ ( DaysValid ? DaysValid : 1) ) ) ;
Name = X509_get_subject_name ( Cert ) ;
i f ( Country && ∗Country )
X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt (Name , ”C” , MBSTRING_ASC,
Country , −1, −1, 0) ;
// JS 2018−02−05 Add (S) t a t e and (L) o c a l i t y f i e l d s to
g e t v a l i d CSR
i f ( S ta te && ∗ State )
X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt (Name , ”ST” , MBSTRING_ASC
, State , −1, −1, 0) ;
i f ( L o c a l i t y && ∗ Lo c a l i t y )
X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt (Name , ”L” , MBSTRING_ASC,
Loca l i t y , −1, −1, 0) ;
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X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt (Name , ”OU” , MBSTRING_ASC,
c e r t i s s u an c e , −1, −1, 0) ;
i f ( OrganizationName && ∗OrganizationName )
X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt (Name , ”O” , MBSTRING_ASC,
OrganizationName , −1, −1, 0) ;
i f (CommonName && ∗CommonName)
X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt (Name , ”CN” , MBSTRING_ASC
, CommonName, −1, −1, 0) ;
X509_set_issuer_name ( Cert , Name) ;
// Set t he DNS name
i f (DNSName && ∗DNSName)
{ X509_EXTENSION ∗Extens ion ;
char Buf f e r [ 5 1 2 ] ;
// Format the va l u e
s p r i n t f ( Buf fe r , ”DNS:%s ” , DNSName) ;
Extens ion = X509V3_EXT_conf_nid (NULL, NULL,
NID_subject_alt_name , Bu f f e r ) ;
i f ( Extens ion )
{
X509_add_ext ( Cert , Extension , −1) ;
X509_EXTENSION_free ( Extens ion ) ;
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}
else {
f p r i n t f ( s td e r r , ”SAN␣ ex t en s i on ␣ f a i l e d ! \ n” ) ;
}
}
// JS key hand l ing
PrivateKey=newerkey ( ) ;
f p r i n t f ( s td e r r , ”Key␣ c r ea t ed ␣ at ␣%p\n” , PrivateKey ) ;
// Set t he c e r t i f i c a t e ’ s p u b l i c key from the p r i v a t e
key o b j e c t
i f ( ! X509_set_pubkey ( Cert , PrivateKey ) )
break ;
i f ( ! s i g n c e r t ( Cert ) )
break ;
// PrivateKey now be l on g s to Cert , so don ’ t c l ean i t
up s e p a r a t e l y
// Ac t ua l l y reused l a t e r ! PrivateKey = NULL;
// Success
f p r i n t f ( s td e r r , ” Cert ␣ c r e a t ed ␣OK\n” ) ;
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Succe s s = 1 ;
} while ( 0 ) ;
// Things we a lways c l ean up
i f (BigNumber )
BN_free (BigNumber ) ;
// Things we c l ean up on ly on f a i l u r e
i f ( ! Succe s s )
{
f p r i n t f ( s td e r r , ” C e r t i f i c a t e ␣ i n i t ␣ e r r o r : \ n” ) ;
ERR_print_errors_fp ( s t d e r r ) ;
i f ( Cert )
X509_free ( Cert ) ;
i f ( PrivateKey )
EVP_PKEY_free ( PrivateKey ) ;
i f ( KeyPair )
RSA_free ( KeyPair ) ;
Cert = NULL;
}
// Return the c e r t i f i c a t e ( or NULL)
return ( Cert ) ;
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}
void con f i gu r e_cont ex t (SSL_CTX ∗ ctx )
{
SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto ( ctx , 1) ;
/∗ Set t he key and c e r t ∗/
i f ( SSL_CTX_use_certif icate ( ctx , owncert ) <= 0) {
ERR_print_errors_fp ( s t d e r r ) ;
e x i t (EXIT_FAILURE) ;
}
i f ( SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey ( ctx , PrivateKey ) <= 0 ) {
ERR_print_errors_fp ( s t d e r r ) ;
e x i t (EXIT_FAILURE) ;
}
// JS 2018−02−05 Use decen t c i p h e r s on ly !
SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list ( ctx , ”EECDH+AESGCM:EDH+AESGCM:
AES256+EECDH: AES256+EDH:ECDH+AES128 :RSA+AES128” ) ;
}
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void p r i n t c s r ( ) {
X509_REQ ∗ req ;
i f ( ! ( req=X509_to_X509_REQ( owncert , PrivateKey , EVP_sha256
( ) ) ) ) {
f p r i n t f ( s td e r r , ” Fa i l ed ␣ to ␣ i n i t i a l i s e ␣CSR\n” ) ;
} else {
PEM_write_X509_REQ( s tde r r , req ) ;
X509_REQ_free ( req ) ;
}
}
#ifde f USE_SMM
#i f USE_SMM == 2
stat ic int init_smm ( ) {
int mapfd ;
uint64_t pagedata ;
i f ( ( commpage=memalign(1<<PAGE_SHIFT,1<<PAGE_SHIFT) ) ) {
memset ( commpage ,11 ,1<<PAGE_SHIFT) ;
i f ( ! mlock ( commpage,1<<PAGE_SHIFT) ) {
i f ( ! ioperm (0xB2 , 1 , 1 ) ) {
i f ( ( mapfd=open ( ”/ proc / s e l f /pagemap” ,O_RDONLY) )
==−1) {
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pe r r o r ( ”Could␣not ␣ a c c e s s ␣/ proc / s e l f /pagemap : ” ) ;
} else {
i f ( pread (mapfd ,&pagedata , s i zeo f ( pagedata ) , ( (
uint64_t ) commpage )>>(PAGE_SHIFT−3) )==s i zeo f (
pagedata ) ) {
p r i n t f ( ”Page␣ data : ␣0x%016 l x \n” , pagedata ) ;
i f ( pagedata & 1ULL<<63) { // Page p r e s en t in
b i t s [ 0 : 5 4 ]
pagedata &= (1ULL<<55)−1; // Ex t rac t j u s t
t he page number b i t s
// pagedata<<=PAGE_SHIFT;
i f ( pagedata <(1ULL<<20)) {
pagenum=pagedata ;
c l o s e (mapfd ) ;
f p r i n t f ( s td e r r , ” Ma i l s l o t ␣page ␣ e s t ab l i s h ed ,
␣ v i r t u a l ␣%p␣ phy s i c a l ␣0x%08x” , commpage ,
pagenum) ;
do_smmcrypto ( ) ;
f p r i n t f ( s td e r r , ” Pub l i c ␣key␣ r e t r i e v ed , ␣
f i r s t ␣ o c t e t ␣ i s ␣%02x\n” ,∗ commpage ) ;
memcpy( public_key , commpage ,uECC_BYTES∗2) ;
return 1 ;
} else {
f p r i n t f ( s td e r r , ”Workspace␣page ␣%lx ␣ ou t s i d e
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␣bottom␣4␣Gb\n” , pagedata ) ; // 714000
}
}
}
c l o s e (mapfd ) ;
}
}
munlock ( commpage,1<<PAGE_SHIFT) ;
}
f r e e ( commpage ) ;
commpage=0;
}
return 0 ;
}
#endif
#endif
const unsigned char
country [ ]= ”GB” ,
s t a t e [ ]= ” Scot land ” ,
c i t y [ ]= ”Perth ” ,
orgname [ ]= ”James␣ Suther land ” ,
commonname [ ]= ”home . deadnode . org ” ;
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int main ( int UNUSED( argc ) , char ∗∗ UNUSED( argv ) )
{
struct t imeva l tv ;
int sock ;
SSL_CTX ∗ ctx ;
#ifde f USE_SMM
ma i l s l o t=mmap(NULL,4096 ,PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_SHARED,−1 ,0) ;
i f ( ma i l s l o t==MAP_FAILED) {
pe r r o r ( ”mmap( ) ␣ f a i l e d ! \ n” ) ;
return −1;
}
#i f USE_SMM == 0 // I n l i n e mode
uECC_make_key( public_key , pr ivate_key ) ;
#e l i f USE_SMM == 1 // Forked mode
i f ( p ipe ( i p c p i p e s [ 0 ] )==−1 | | p ipe ( i p c p i p e s [ 1 ] ) ==−1) {
pe r r o r ( ” p ipe ” ) ;
return −1;
}
switch ( f o r k ( ) ) {
case −1:
p e r r o r ( ” f o r k ” ) ;
return −1;
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case 0 : // Become worker p roce s s
c l o s e ( i p c p i p e s [ 0 ] [ 1 ] ) ;
c l o s e ( i p c p i p e s [ 1 ] [ 0 ] ) ;
keyworker ( i p c p i p e s [ 0 ] [ 0 ] , i p c p i p e s [ 1 ] [ 1 ] ) ;
return 0 ;
default :
c l o s e ( i p c p i p e s [ 0 ] [ 0 ] ) ;
c l o s e ( i p c p i p e s [ 1 ] [ 1 ] ) ;
worker_r=i p c p i p e s [ 1 ] [ 0 ] ;
worker_w=ip cp i p e s [ 0 ] [ 1 ] ;
i f ( read ( worker_r ,&worker_c , s i zeo f ( worker_c ) ) != s i zeo f (
worker_c ) ) {
p e r r o r ( ”Worker␣ i n i t ” ) ;
return −1;
}
memcpy( public_key , ma i l s l o t ,uECC_BYTES∗2) ;
break ;
}
#else // True SMM!
i f ( ! init_smm ( ) ) {
return −1;
}
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#endif
#endif
OPENSSL_cpuid_setup ( ) ;
i n i t_op en s s l ( ) ;
ge t t imeo fday (&tv ,NULL) ;
owncert=C r e a t eC e r t i f i c a t e ( country , s t a t e , c i t y , orgname ,
commonname , commonname , tv . tv_sec , 3 6 5 ) ;
p r i n t c s r ( ) ;
c tx = crea te_context ( ) ;
c on f i gu r e_cont ex t ( ctx ) ;
sock = crea t e_socke t (4433) ;
/∗ Handle connec t i ons ∗/
while ( 1 ) {
struct sockaddr_in addr ;
u in t l en = s i zeo f ( addr ) ;
SSL ∗ s s l ;
const char r ep l y [ ] = ”HTTP/1 .0 ␣200␣OK\ r \nContent−Type :
␣ t ex t / p l a i n \ r \n\ r \n” ;
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int c l i e n t = accept ( sock , ( struct sockaddr ∗)&addr , &
l en ) ;
i f ( c l i e n t < 0) {
pe r r o r ( ”Unable ␣ to ␣ accept ” ) ;
e x i t (EXIT_FAILURE) ;
}
s s l = SSL_new( ctx ) ;
SSL_set_fd ( s s l , c l i e n t ) ;
i f ( SSL_accept ( s s l ) <= 0) {
ERR_print_errors_fp ( s t d e r r ) ;
}
else {
char bu f f [ 1 0 2 4 ] ;
int n , fd ;
n=SSL_read ( s s l , bu f f , s i zeo f ( bu f f ) ) ;
i f (n>0) {
i f ( ( fd=open ( ” index . html ” ,O_RDONLY) ) !=−1) {
struct s t a t s b u f f ;
i f ( f s t a t ( fd ,& s bu f f ) !=−1) {
void ∗ bu f f=mal loc ( s b u f f . s t_ s i z e ) ;
i f ( bu f f ) {
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read ( fd , buf f , s b u f f . s t_ s i z e ) ;
SSL_write ( s s l , r ep ly , s i zeo f ( r ep l y ) ) ;
SSL_write ( s s l , bu f f , s b u f f . s t_ s i z e ) ;
f r e e ( bu f f ) ;
} else {
f p r i n t f ( s td e r r , ”OOM!\ n” ) ;
}
} else {
pe r r o r ( ” f s t a t ( index . html ) ” ) ;
}
c l o s e ( fd ) ;
} else {
pe r r o r ( ” index . html ” ) ;
}
}
}
SSL_free ( s s l ) ;
c l o s e ( c l i e n t ) ;
}
c l o s e ( sock ) ;
SSL_CTX_free ( ctx ) ;
c l eanup_openss l ( ) ;
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}
Glossary
ACME Automatic Certificate Management Environment.
AES Advanced Encryption Standard.
AESKEYGENASSIST AES Key Generation Assist, the instruction used to
expand raw AES encryption keys to the full schedule used for encryption.
ARM Advanced RISC Machines/Acorn RISC Machines.
ARMORED An implementation of the TRESOR encryption on ARM platforms.
ASLR Address Space Layout Randomisation.
BIOS Basic Input/Output System, the system firmware on the IBM PC.
CA Certificate Authority.
CATT CAn’t Touch This, a RowHammer attack mitigation.
CDN Content Delivery Network.
CLI CLear Interrupt flag x86 instruction.
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CPU Central Processing Unit.
CPY CoPY instruction.
CS Code Segment/Code Selector register on x86.
CSR Certificate Signing Request.
CVE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures.
DCI Direct Connect Interface, an Intel debugging extension to USB 3.
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service attack.
DMA Direct Memory Access.
DNS Domain Name System.
DOS Disk Operating System.
DoS Denial of Service attack.
DRAM Dynamic Random Access Memory.
FDIV Floating Point Division x86 instruction.
FPGA Field Programmable Gate Array.
FROST Forensic Recovery Of Scrambled Telephones.
GMU George Mason University, Virginia, USA.
HSM Hardware Security Module.
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HTML HyperText Markup Language.
HTTP HyperText Transfer Protocol, RFC 2616 and subsequent.
HTTPS HTTP Secure.
IBM International Business Machines.
ICE In Circuit Emulation.
ICEBP ICE BreakPoint.
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers.
IN INput instruction.
IOMMU I/O Memory Management Unit.
IOPB I/O Permissions Bitmap.
IOPL I/O Privilege Level.
IOV I/O Virtualisation.
JIT Just In Time.
JTAG Joint Test Action Group.
KAISER Kernel And user Space Isolation.
KPTI Kernel Page Table Isolation.
LOADALL Load All register contents x86 instruction.
Glossary 149
MCH Memory Controller Hub.
MIPS Microprocessor without Interlocked Pipeline Stages, also MIPS Technolo-
gies.
MIT Massachussetts Institute of Technology.
MTRR Memory Type Range Register.
OS Operating System.
OUT OUTput.
OUTB OUTput Byte x86 instruction.
PCI Peripheral Component Interconnect.
RAM Random Access Memory.
RDS ReaD Select.
RSM ReSuMe x86 instruction for returning from SMM.
SGI Silicon Graphics Inc.
SGX Software Guard Extensions.
SMBASE SMRAM BASE address register.
SMEP Supervisor Mode Execution Prevention.
SMI System Management Interrupt.
SMIACT SMI Active.
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SMM System Management Mode.
SMRAM System Management RAM.
SMRAMC SMRAM Control register.
SNI Server Name Indication, RFC 3546, Transport Layer Security (TLS) Exten-
sions.
SPE Synergistic Processing Element.
SSL Secure Sockets Layer.
STI SeT Interrupt flag x86 instruction.
TCB Trusted Computing Base.
TLB Translation Lookaside Buffer.
TLS Transport Layer Security.
TPM Trusted Platform Module.
TRESOR TRESOR Runs Encryption Securely Outside RAM.
TSEG Top Segment.
TSS Task State Segment.
TZ-RKP TrustZone-based Real-time Kernel Protection.
URL Uniform Resource Locator.
US United States.
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USB Universal Serial Bus.
VM Virtual Machine.
VRAM Video RAM.
WRS WRite Select.
Index
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AES, 4, 41, 42
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ARM, 19, 32, 34, 37
ASLR, 34
BIOS, 29, 31, 32, 55
CA, 47, 54
CDN, 36
CPU, 5, 19, 41, 63
CPY, 12
Credential Guard, 35, 38, 79, 80
CS, 33
CSR, 54
CVE, 4
DCI, 16
DDoS, 24
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DNS, 54
DNSSEC, 79
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FDIV, 42
FPGA, 16
FROST, 37
GCHQ, 24
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HyperCheck, 32, 72, 77
HyperGuard, 32, 34, 72, 77
HyperVerify, 32
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ICE, 29, 30
ICEBP, 30
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JIT, 42
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KAISER, 18
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MCH, 30
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